Some thoughts on the USMNT's defeat to Denmark

The US let a 2-1 lead slip away in the final ten minutes as Niklas Bendtner scored twice late to give Denmark a 3-2 win and complete his first international hat trick. The result was no more than Denmark deserved. They were the better side throughout as the US were desperately poor in possession and unconvincing in defense.

Klinsmann opted for a 4-4-2 with Alejandro Bedoya partnering Michael Bradley in midfield. Clint Dempsey missed out through injury so Aron Johannsson played alongside Jozy Altidore up front. Gyasi Zardes and Fabian Johnson played on the right and left wing respectively. Center back Michael Orozco and right back Timmy Chandler made up the right side of Klinsmann's defense, John Brooks and left back Greg Garza made up the left side.

Denmark played three in the middle of midfield and therefore had a 3 v. 2 advantage over Bedoya and Bradley in that zone. Johannsson didn't drop off to pick up the deepest Danish midfielder and therefore the home side were able to use the spare man to comfortable circulate possession and keep hold of the ball.

There's nothing inherently wrong with losing the possession battle if your defense is well organized and you're effective on the break. The US didn't achieve either of those things tonight. They defended in two deep banks of four well inside their own half. The wide midfielder on the opposite side of the ball tucked into a very narrow position to offer support in the central zones where Bradley and Bedoya were outnumbered. This opened the US to Denmark playing sweeping diagonal balls that switched the point of attacking. Denmark were particularly dangerous hitting these diagonals into the right channel where Brooks, Garza, Johnson and later Brek Shea didn't do well enough passing off runners. Lasse Vibe got into a number of dangerous positions with runs down the right channel that allowed him to cut the ball across the face of goal. He provided a flick for Bendtner's opener then got behind the right shoulder of Garza to receive a diagonal ball over the top that allowed him through on goal. He slashed his volleyed effort wide but the US didn't heed the warning. Bendtner ran into the space to the left of Brooks and received yet another crossfield diagonal ball from Christian Eriksen for Denmark's winner. Seconds later Martin Braithwaite got into a similar position but fluffed his effort.

The most concerning issue for the US however was their incompetence on the ball. Perhaps that could partly be blamed on a poor playing service but it didn't seem to effect the Danes to the same degree. Defending with deep banks of four, the US needed to be dangerous on the counter when they won back possession and to do so they needed to execute quick vertical passes out of the back. They couldn't do it however. Too often the first pass was poor or the receiving player's control let him down.

When Denmark dropped off and allowed the US some time on the ball in midfield the movement from Zardes, Johnson and Johannsson wasn't good enough. There were multiple occasions when both Bradley and Bedoya were forced to keep the ball at their feet longer than they would have liked as they looked for a more advanced player to move into pockets of space. Zardes is of course just finding his feet with the national team and I think Johnson is a better fit at right back, particularly given Chandler's poor performance there this evening. It was a difficult situation for Johannsson given how little of the ball the US had. He's more of a center forward or secondary striker than a creative #10 adept at exploiting pockets of space between the opposition lines so providing a link between the two center midfielders and Altidore was never going to be easy for him. Without that link between midfield and attack the tempo was too slow. The number of long hopeful ball hit towards Altidore was frustrating but came as a result of the US's inability to find a link forward. Neither Zardas nor Johnson tucked inside enough to give the US the numbers in central attacking areas to cause Denmark problems.

Altidore is limited technically but finds way to make impact

I've come to realize I have to accept that Altidore is never going to be particularly good on the ball. At 25 it's difficult imagining him improving his technical ability all that much. His heavy touches and wayward passes are maddening and today's performance wasn't without its frustrating moments. Kareem Benzema he is not. However, it's difficult to fault his movement off the ball and when the US are as poor in possession as they were today his size and physical strength are quite useful in providing a means to get the ball into the attacking third. He's capable of winning physical battles against opposition defenders when longer balls are hit towards him, as he showed for his goal, and draw fouls around the box with his hold up play. His finishing of course has also been good of late. He's proved that at the moment he is the best option at a position where the US is particularly thin. I'd love for him to add the ability of Wilfried Bony, a player Altidore resembles in physical strength, to not only hold up play but also link it forward with clever passes for midfielders making runs from deeper positions. 

Portugal's heavy defeat gives winner of US vs. Ghana massive advantage in Group G

Portugal's heavy defeat at the hands of Germany (currently 3-0 as I type) will provide a massive advantage to the winner of Ghana vs. USA this evening. If there is a winner in that contest, that team will go 3 points clear of their two expected rivals for second with a large advantage in goal difference over Portugal. If the US manage to get a big result in Natal, it would mean that in all likelihood a point against Portugal would be enough to put the them into the knockout stage on 4 points. A draw with Portugal would put the US 3 points clear going into the final day with at least a 4 goal advantage (make that 5 as Muller has just added a 4th for Germany) on goal difference as things stand now. That would leave the US simply needing a close defeat to Germany to get through barring Portugal don't pick up a lopsided win over Ghana.

Knowing that a draw could be enough against Portugal would provide the US a big tactical advantage. They could maintain a compact defensive shape, forcing Portugal to open themselves up and attack, leaving space for the US on the break. Portugal are not a side that's comfortable playing proactively. They prefer to allow their opponents to control the game, then break quickly down the channels through Ronaldo and Nani. It's not a side littered with midfield creativity and they could therefore struggle when being forced to pick apart a crowded defense. Their three central midfielders in their 4-3-3 formation, Raul Meireles, Miguel Veloso and Joao Moutinho, all sit fairly deep in front of the back four and look to provide more defensive cover than attacking endeavor. Moutinho is a skilled passer but none of the three are creative #10 types that will link play with the center forward. While it may be a frightening thought for fans of US soccer to sit deep with an inexperienced back four, it may be a better option than opening themselves up and allowing Ronaldo the space to dribble forward on the break. 

This discussion is of course irrelevant if the US fail to beat a very strong Ghana side but if they can somehow manage that feat they'll have a much better shot at progressing than anyone would have imagined when the groups were drawn.

Is 2014 destined to be a repeat of 1998 for the U.S. team?

Members of the U.S. team participate in an open training session outside of Washington, DC before a friendly vs. Brazil in May of 2012.

The United States had not qualified for the World Cup since 1950 when Paul Caliguiri scored an all-important goal in Port of Spain to defeat Trinidad & Tobago and secure a U.S. berth to the 1990 World Cup in Italy. In each of the past six World Cups (1990 through 2010), the performance of the U.S. team has exhibited an obvious if not especially meaningful pattern: the team falters at the group stage in every other World Cup (1990, 1998, and 2006) and advances at least past the group stage in the subsequent tournament (1994, 2002, and 2010).

Will the 2014 U.S. team follow this pattern and suffer elimination at the group stage in Brazil? Unfortunately, this U.S. team bears several eerie similarities to the 1998 team, which finished the tournament dead last with three losses and a goal difference of -4, rather than say, the 2002 U.S. team, which genuinely outplayed the Germans in the quarterfinals and missed out on a trip to the semifinals because of a blatant handball on the goal line. While mostly inconsequential, the similarities between the 2014 team and the 1998 team are striking enough to be a bit disconcerting:

• Controversy surrounding the inclusion of dual citizens in the squad late in the World Cup cycle – As in the 1998 tournament when coach Steve Sampson added French-American David Regis, Jurgen Klinsmann has opted to include several dual nationals. Most controversially, Klinsmann named 18-year-old, German-American Julian Green to the roster whose first-team experience at the time of the decision was limited to a 58th-minute substitute appearance for the U.S. in a friendly vs. Mexico and an 87th-minute substitute appearance for Bayern Munich in the Champions League. In other words, Klinsmann included a player on the roster who had just over a half an hour of cumulative first-team experience for club and country.
•  Controversy surrounding the exclusion of a marquee player – Again, like 1998 when then captain John Harkes was surprisingly omitted from the roster, Klinsmann unceremoniously cut Landon Donovan—arguably the best player in U.S. soccer history—when the U.S. coach pared the roster down from 30 to 23. While the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of Harkes turned out to be quite salacious (details of an affair between Harkes and Wynalda’s wife surfaced over a decade after that World Cup), Donovan’s exclusion seems to be the end product of a tumultuous relationship with Klinsmann rather than a relationship with a teammate’s wife.
•  Deployment of relatively unique tactics – In 1998, Steve Sampson utilized a 3-6-1 formation, which Matthew Doyle generously describes as “the first (and to date, only) truly revolutionary tactical innovation to come from American soccer.” Doyle’s description of the formation is wildly hyperbolic, as the formation is more aptly described as a fleeting tactical experiment that failed to yield success. While far less unorthodox than a 3-6-1, Klinsmann will likely field a diamond midfield rather than a 4-2-3-1 formation, which is expected to be the formation for many (if not most) of the sides in the 2014 World Cup.
• A difficult group that contains Germany – In 1998, the U.S., Germany, Yugoslavia, and Iran were drawn into Group F, and the 2014 U.S. team faces Germany, Portugal, and Ghana in Group G. While the 2014 group draw is likely more difficult than the 1998 draw, Germany and Yugoslavia were heavily favored to advance in 1998 just as Germany and Portugal are favored to advance in 2014. That said, the U.S. had a moderately difficult group in 2002 that included Portugal, and the U.S. managed to defeat Portugal and advance.

Are the similarities between the 2014 and 1998 teams cause for pessimism? Other than the difficulty of the group, I would argue probably not. I disagree with some of the roster decisions, especially Donovan’s omission, but, Michael Bradley aside, few individuals in the U.S. player pool stand out from one another. A diamond midfield, while interesting, isn’t particularly bizarre like a 3-6-1, and the U.S. team has looked steady in the formation in warm-up matches.

In the event of an exit at the group stage, the media will almost surely form a narrative about chemistry problems within the team based on conjecture and interviews with disgruntled players. For instance, after a short string of disappointing results during World Cup qualification, several players anonymously complained about “flagging faith in Klinsmann, his staff and his methods, along with the squad’s absence of harmony.” Of course, almost immediately after that article’s publication, Klinsmann’s disharmonious squad defeated Costa Rica in snowy conditions in Colorado and drew with Mexico at the intimidating Estadio Azteca. For the remainder of the 2013 calendar year, the U.S. team posted an impressive 16-3-2 record.

FiveThirtyEight gives the U.S. about a 35-percent chance of advancing past the group stage, while betting markets give the U.S. about a 27-percent chance. This is not to say that things within the control of the manager like tactics and personnel decisions don’t matter, but these decisions have somewhat limited influence on outcomes. If the U.S. team fails to advance past the group, the most likely, but more boring, explanation is simply that the U.S. is a good but not great team in an extremely difficult group.

In defense of the 1994 U.S. World Cup uniforms

Pontiac Silverdome in Pontiac, MI: The pre-match ceremony before a group-stage match in the 1994 World Cup between the United States and Switzerland.

During the months before a world cup, sports writers often build anticipation for the quadrennial event with memories from world cups past. This summer marks the 20th anniversary of the 1994 World Cup in which the U.S., as hosts, shocked much of the world by advancing past the group stage.

In the build up to the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, unsurprisingly, the U.S. soccer media have focused much of their attention on the 1994 U.S. team (see, for instance, Roger Bennett’s four-part series for ESPN and Seth Vertelney’s long-form piece for SB Nation). Alan Siegel has an article on  Slate.com about the 1994 U.S. jerseys with the understated headline: “The Horrifying True Story of the Ugliest Jerseys in U.S. Soccer History.”

Siegel’s Slate article is certainly worth a read, but he seems to commit an error of anachronistic analysis: he harshly judges the ’94 faux-denim uniforms through a contemporary lens of soccer fashion almost entirely absent any historical context. It could be that I am misremembering given that I was only about 8 years old at the time and that it has been 20 years, or it could be that my fashion sense at age 8 wasn’t especially refined, but I distinctly remember those uniforms being awesome.

Siegel notes, “The jersey featured a denim print, oddly shaped floating white stars, and bright red trim, and it was made of 100 percent polyester.” The 1990s were something of an experimental period in soccer fashion full of strange geometry and bright colors. And, polyester uniforms were the norm at the time—moisture-wicking fabrics like Nike Dri-FIT and Adidas Climalite didn’t yet exist. The point is that those U.S. jerseys weren’t especially “out there” in 1994. The uniforms of Germany, Nigeria, and Spain (among many others) are similarly “ugly” through a contemporary lens. The U.S. jerseys were awesome in 1994 precisely because they were the essence of 1990s soccer fashion, and they remain awesome for that very reason.

In the article, Siegel describes the players’ reactions to first seeing the uniform based on retrospective accounts: “After the uniform unveiling, the normally loquacious Yanks didn’t say a word. ‘It was the longest silence I’d ever heard from our team,’ remembers forward Eric Wynalda. Then, laughter broke out.” Given the fashion trends in the sport at the time, I am skeptical as to whether the unveiling really went as such. As Thompson (1972) notes in his paper on the problems with the oral history method, “With retrospective interviews we have the additional problem of deciding whether they [subjects] are being influenced by recent changes in values and norms and so re-interpreting their perceptions.”

I should disclose that I am especially sensitive to criticism of the ‘94 U.S. World Cup uniform. The stonewashed faux-denim shirt clad with white stars was the first replica jersey that I owned. My grandparents bought me the kit for my 8th birthday. As excited as I was to receive the gift, I couldn’t hide my disappointment that they had bought the faux-denim shorts that were supposed to go with the red-and-white-striped away shirt rather than the star-clad home shirt; tears strewn down my face as I realized I wouldn’t be wearing the proper full kit to my two soccer practices that week.

To this day, that jersey remains one my most prized possessions, and it now fits my adult physique perfectly, which says a lot about the baggy design of jerseys in the 1990s and the surprising dearth of size options for smaller kids. It is my only item of clothing that anyone has offered to purchase off my back for cash (which has happened on multiple occasions).  Say what you want about the 1994 U.S. World Cup team, just don’t call their jerseys ugly.