Thoughts and recap: France 1-1 Spain

This was a game of two halves with Spain controlling the first with patient buildup play and France dominating the second on the counter.

France defended very deep in the first half with a bank of five in midfield in front of the back four. Only Benzema stayed behind the ball. The deep defensive line allowed Spain's midfield to comfortably dictate the tempo of the game. Very little pressure was put on Xavi and Xabi Alonso in deeper areas. Fabregas, Cazorla and Iniesta all looked to get in space between France's midfield and back four and combined for some tidy interchanges in these areas. Spain caused France the most trouble when they were able to get in between the seams, turn and face the back four, and slide balls in behind the back four.

France should have taken a lesson from Portugal manager Paulo Bento's excellent tactical set up against Spain in the Euros. Bento played his midfielders higher up the pitch and pressed Xabi Alonso and Xavi when they got in possession around the midfield line. This broke up Spain's rhythm and halted service into their more advanced playmakers. The plan was to win possession back higher up the field and then quickly counter through Nani and Ronaldo on the wings. Although Ronaldo missed a decent chance and Portugal never got the goal they needed, the plan frustrated Spain into playing more long passes than they would have liked and the game ultimately ended 0-0.

By playing such a deep line, France gave Spain's deeper lying players the opportunity to pick their heads up and find a penetrating pass forward. Xavi and Xabi Alonso are brilliant passers more than capable of threading a decisive ball through tight areas. France were clearly looking to counter when they did win the ball back. However, with the defense sitting so deep and inviting pressure, when they did win back possession it was in and around their own 18. Spain were able to press immediately, denying France a decent outlet pass and forcing them to launch hopeful long balls for Benzema that Spain were comfortably able to win back. They needed to win the ball back higher up the field to spark quick counters.

 In the second half France finally started pressing the Spanish midfield higher up the pitch, unsettling the rhythm they had been able to establish in the first half. Deschamps replaced Menez and Gonalons with more combative midfielders Moussa Sissoko and Blaise Matuidi. Both were outstanding, continuously nicking possession from Spain in midfield and spring dangerous counter attacks, mainly through Valbuena, Ribery and Benzema. They looked excellent on the counter, creating several dangerous scoring opportunities only to be spoiled by some wasteful finishing. The breakthrough finally came in the last minute of stoppage time when Juanfran inexplicably gave the ball way in midfield, allowing one final France counter forward. Matuidi picked the ball off Juanfran and released Ribery down the left. He crossed in for second half substitute Olivier Giroud who made no mistake, heading in on the last play of the game. France were deservedly rewarded for their adventurous play in the second half.

US continue to struggle to turn possession into goals

Daniel rightfully pointed out that my previous post gave far too much credit to Jurgen Klinsmann for making what any professional soccer coach would have realized was a necessary move away from Bob Bradley's 4-4-2 and introducing three-man central midfield formations. During Bradley's tenure, it became rather obvious his favored 4-4-2 was allowing the opposition too much space in the center of the park- Klinsmann can hardly be considered a brilliant tactician simply for recognizing that fact. While his tactical shifts have created a more solid spine down the center of the field, the US continues to struggle to translate midfield dominance into genuine goal scoring opportunities. A 92nd minute goal from Eddie Johnson against Antigua & Barbuda spared Klinsmann the blushes of what would have been one of the most humiliating defeats in the team's history but signaled the team has to improve quickly if they want to avoid a nervous final phase of qualification.

Some of the US's offensive difficulties can reasonably be blamed on the challenges that accompany playing CONCACAF opposition on the road- playing on dreadful pitches in front of hostile crowds is no easy task (although it would be quite a stretch to say the 8,000 fans that attended Sir Vivian Richards Stadium Friday created an intimidating atmosphere), particularly in torrential weather when the opposition defends with all 10 men in their own defensive third. However, it's still deeply concerning that the US has had such a difficult time converting dominant possession figures into genuine goal scoring opportunities against vastly inferior opposition. Despite holding 72% possession Friday against Antigua & Barbuda, the US could only muster four shots on target. The frightening truth is that the US has not looked good on the road once in this phase of qualifying. In fact, you could reasonably argue the first half of the 1-0 home win over Jamaica was the only decent half we've played thus far.

One good half out of ten played does not bode well for the team in the final hexagonal phase of qualification, assuming the US get a result over Guatemala tonight and qualify. Based on current standings, the hexagonal would consist of Guatemala, USA, Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama and Canada. With the possible exception of Canada, those are all very difficult places to play. Given current form, it doesn't seem inconceivable that the US could struggle to finish in the top three and secure automatic qualification.

How responsible Klinsmann is for the recent run of unconvincing performances is difficult to say. While he can take credit for the fact his controversial roster inclusions of Alan Gordon and Eddie Johnson proved to be a difference maker against A&B, legitimate questions should be raised about how the US put themselves in a position where they needed a last minute winner in the first place. This phase of qualifying was expected to be a cakewalk for the Americans and it probably should have been. That they've left themselves with work still to do in the final game against Guatemala to ensure passage to the next stage suggests the US may not be adjusting to Klinsmann as quickly as had been hoped. We knew from the outset Klinsmann wanted to introduce a patient, possession-based system and has done so. But while his style has certainly allowed the US to dominate possession, too much of that possession occurs in the middle third of the field. As we move the ball into the attacking third we often lack the technical ability and inventiveness required to unlock compact defenses. Throughout the field, the ball moves from player to player too slowly, allowing defenses to easily shift and retain their proper shape. There's a sneaking suspicion that Klinsmann's ambition for how he wants the team to play does not much the technical ability of the players at his disposal. While I applaud his ambition of bringing a more modern brand of football to the USMNT, his job is, first and foremost, to qualify for the World Cup. Qualifiers are not the time to be dogmatic about your ideals, sometimes pragmatism is necessary.

This isn't to say Klinsmann is doomed to fail. The world of international football has its examples of teams that have struggled in the buildup to major tournaments but gone on to achieve great things. Carlos Bilardo won only three of his first 15 games in charge of Argentina and only one of seven in the buildup to the 1986 World Cup. Argentina would go on to win that tournament. The US is obviously less talented than Argentina and no one is expecting them to win the World Cup in Brazil but the point is that Klinsmann will ultimately be judged on how he performs at the World Cup if the US qualify, not on how convincing they were in qualification. Poor performances in qualifiers and friendlies would be quickly forgotten if Klinsmann can get the team into the knockout stages in Brazil. The challenges of playing in a World Cup are very different than those of a CONCACAF qualifying campaign and may actually better suit Klinsmann's style of play. Pitches will certainly be wider than 70 yards so there will be better opportunities to stretch defenses laterally and play with more width. Few if any teams will be frightened enough of the US to defend with nine men in the defensive third so there should be more opportunities to get in dangerous pockets of space in and around the 18 and more opportunities to counter. Opponents will be more talented but will also open themselves up. This should allow the US to rely less on technique and clever passing-which they've been forced to do against compact CONCACAF defenses and isn't the strongest aspect of the American's game- and more on athleticism.

Getting ahead of myself though. Let's get a result tonight first.

Preview: Arsenal vs. West Ham

Possible Lineups:

Arsenal will line up in their usual 4-2-3-1. With Diaby out due to a hamstring injury, we may see Ramsey slide back from an attacking right-sided position to a central position alongside Arteta. Coquellin was given the start alongside Arteta in the Champions League in midweek but against a West Ham side that lacks a strong creative presence in the center of midfield, Arteta should be fine occupying the holding midfield role on his own. Ramsey will provide more going forward than Coquellin. Despite a run of relatively unimpressive performances, Oxlade-Chamberlain will likely be given the start on the right. With Andy Carroll expected to be given the nod at center forward for West Ham, expect Per Mertesacker to replace Koscielny to provide some height at the back.

Expect West Ham to line up in a 4-2-3-1 that operates more as a 4-5-1 when Arsenal are in possession, with the two wingers dropping back alongside Diame and Noble to form two banks of four. Jarvis looked lively on the left wing in West Ham's 2-1 win over QPR Monday but, against Arsenal, Sam Allardyce may opt for the more defensive Matthew Taylor. O'Brien and Reid both picked up knocks in the QPR game. Reid is expected to play while O'Brien's status is less certain- we could see George McCartney replace him at left back. Andy Carroll is expected to be given the start after he returned from a hamstring injury Monday.

West Ham

• O'Brien (McCartney) and Demel will likely be fairly reluctant to join in the attack when in possession so as not to leave spaces behind them for Podolski and Oxlade-Chamberlain to counter into.
• Diame, Nolan and Noble will all look to shuffe the ball into wide areas to the wingers Vaz Te or Jarvis (if he plays). They'll try to either hit an early ball into Carroll towards the back post or take on the Arsenal outside backs and then cross. When West Ham do look for Carroll at the back post, he'll have the option of either going for goal himself or knocking the ball down. Nolan will look to get close to him to win the second ball.
• West Ham's back four will play long balls directly into Carroll. When they took this direct route Monday with Carlton Cole at forward, Jarvis would cut in from the left wing and run behind Cole to get on the end of a flicked header. 
• The Hammers will try to win as many free kicks as possible. They'll hoof the ball in towards Carroll from set pieces anywhere on the field and look to get on the end of his knock downs.

Arsenal

• The Gunners should dominate possession the center of midfield.
• West Ham will likely play a 4-5-1 in defense with the wingers dropping back to form a bank of four with Diame and Noble. Jenkinson and Gibbs should be brave with their offensive positioning, getting into advanced positions and pushing the West Ham wingers deep into their own half. This will leave Carroll isolated when West Ham do recover possession. They'll be forced to knock it long towards Carroll and hope he can hold possession until the midfield transitions forward.
• With Gervinho at center forward, Arsenal will be very flexible in the center of the park. Look for Cazorla, Gervinho and Ramsey to find pockets of space in between the lines to get on the ball. They'll play short combinations of passes and look for seams in the back four to get in behind. They could find it difficult against a crowded back four.
• Arsenal have to improve their set piece defending. Three of the four goals they've conceded in the Premier League have come from set pieces and in West Ham they're facing an opponent who thrives at scoring from deadball situations. Koscielny was largely responsible for the two goals conceded to Chelsea last weekend and in all likelihood he'll be replaced by the taller Mertesacker to provide some height. However, despite his 6'6" frame, Mertesacker's aerial ability has at times been suspect. He'll have to be diligent in aerial challenges with Carroll.

Recap: West Ham 2-1 QPR

West Ham scored twice from lofted crosses to the back post to secure a win in a gritty game lacking in technical quality.

Combined, the two sides completed just 504 passes, the third fewest in a Premier League game this season (Reading vs. Stoke produced a remarkably low 369 completed passes and Norwich vs. QPR had just 455 completed passes).

West Ham lined up in a 4-5-1 with Carlton Cole given the start at forward. Andy Carroll returned to the substitutes bench after being sidelined with a hamstring injury. QPR employed a 4-4-2 with Djibril Cisse and Bobby Zamora at forward. Shaun Wright Phillips played right wing and Ji Sung Park operated on the left but slightly more narrow.

Central Midfield Zone

West Ham's 4-5-1 gave them a man advantage in the center of midfield and they used their numerical superiority to completely prevent QPR's two central midfielders, Esteban Granero and Alejandro Faurlin, from getting on the ball. With virtually no presence in the center of midfield, QPR struggled to link play between defense and attack and were forced too often to hit hopeful long balls to the corners for Cisse and Zamora. Faurlin and Granero completed just 46 and 35 passes respectively, fairly low numbers for center midfielders. Combined they completed only 20 passes in the attacking third. It was apparent within 25 minutes that QPR needed an extra man in the center of midfield to allow them to get some possession and build play through the midfield. However, Mark Hughes stuck with just the two center midfielders for the whole first half and QPR continued to struggle to develop any rhythm in their play.

West Ham's Crossing and Direct Play
Despite their numerical advantage in the center of midfield, West Ham showed little interest in using the extra man to control possession. They looked to get the ball in wide areas to wingers Matthew Jarvis and Ricardo Vaz Te to send crosses into the box or knock the ball long into Cole for him to flick on. The midfield trio of Kevin Nolan, Mark Noble and Mohamed Diame completed just 26, 46 and 22 passes respectively. When they did get the ball they looked to shuffle it to Vaz Te and Jarvis. As is so often the case at West Ham, Cole was often an isolated figure up front but he did well to hold the ball up and flick on aerial challenges. When the Hammers played the ball long out of the back, Jarvis would tuck in and run behind Cole for the flick. It was pretty rudimentary stuff but QPR never looked comfortable defending crosses into the box.

Substitutions
Sam Allardyce was forced to make two like-for-like substitutions in the first half when Winston Reid and Joey O'Brien had to exit due to injury for West Ham. James Tomkins replaced Reid and George McCartney replaced O'Brien.


After 56 minutes Hughes finally addressed the need for extra bodies in the center of midfield and replaced Wright-Phillips with Samba Diakite and Park with Adel Taarabt. Diakite played in the middle, forming a central midfield trio with Fuarlin and Granero. Taarabt played narrow on the left but cut into the middle frequently and seemed to be given free reign to move into positions to get on the ball. The change in shape paid immediate dividends for QPR. Diakite provided an extra body in the midfield and some powerful runs forward while Taarabt gave QPR some creativity and urgency in the final third. Immediately the home sign began to control the play and were finally able to effectively transition the ball from the defensive third to attack. Taarabt's goal was a bit of individual brilliance but he was able to cut in from the left and take the shot because West Ham's center midfielders were occupied elsewhere.

With his side clinging to a 2-1 lead and being overrun in the center of the park, Allardyce would have been wise to use his final substitution to pull either Jarvis or Vaz Te for a player that could compete and win balls in the center of midfield. Yossi Benayoun and Gary O'Neil were the only two midfielders on the West Ham subs bench so O'Neil probably would have been the preferred choice. However, Allardyce elected to go with another like-for-like sub, replacing Cole with Carroll.

Just three minutes after Carroll's introduction, Diakite picked up a second yellow for QPR. Their brief spell of midfield dominance ended and West Ham were able to see out the 2-1 win.

Conclusion
This was a game of rather poor quality but an entertaining one to watch develop nonetheless. Against a relatively combative West Ham center midfield three, Hughes should have moved away from his 4-4-2 with wingers earlier to get an extra body in the center of midfield. He ultimately made the right substitutions but why he waited 11 minutes into the second half when it was painfully obvious QPR had no midfield presence is a mystery. 

The modern football sweeper

"The fishing fleet lies dark against the sun-washed sea. Along the Tyrrhenian waterfront, a stressed football manager, unable to sleep, takes an early-morning walk. Oblivious to the shrieking of the gulls and the haggling of the dockside mongers, he strides on, asking himself again and again how he can get the best out of his side, ponders how he can strengthen a defence that, for all his best efforts, remains damagingly porous. As he paces the harbour, churning the problem over and over in his head, a boat catches his eye. The fishermen haul in one net, swollen with fish, and then behind it, another: the reserve net. This is his eureka moment. Some fish inevitably slip the first net, but they are caught by the second; he realises that what his side needs is a reserve defender operating behind the main defense to catch those forwards who slip through. That manager was Gipo Viani, his team was Salernitana, and his invention was catenaccio."

-Excerpt from Jonathan Wilson's Inverting the Pyramid: The History of Football Tactics on the development of catenaccio, the system made famous by Helenio Herrera at Inter Milan in the 1960s. The system employed a libero, or sweeper, who sat in behind a line of man marking defenders to provide cover and focused on counter attacking with long balls out of the back. In Herrera's version, the libero played behind four man marking defenders (in other versions the libero sat behind three defenders), creating a five man defense in a 5-3-2 formation. Inter would win three Italian league titles, two European Cups and two Intercontinental Cups under Herrera.

Herrera's version of catenaccio ultimately fell out of favor after Inter were beaten 2-0 by Ajax in the final of the 1972 European Cup. Inter's rigid four man markers were drug all over the field by the fluid movement of Ajax's total football and, subsequently, zonal defending became the norm in professional football.

While man marking is a thing of the past and no top level teams use a traditional libero, certain teams have employed systems that, if not directly influenced by catenaccio, have stemmed from the need to address the same concerns catenaccio was attempting to address: particularly the need to have a free man at the back to provide cover. Juventus's current 3-5-2 system is quite similar to Hererra's 1-4-3-2 catennacio. Both used three central defenders. Although Juventus's three central defenders are more fluid and there is no designated libero to sit deep, the idea is to allow two to pick up attackers moving into their zone while one can drop slightly deeper and provide cover, the same philosophy behind Herrera's system (although Herrera's two center backs marked men rather than zones). Three central defenders allow Juventus's full backs to push higher up the field into attacking positions when in possession, operating as what we call wing backs. Again, this is something Hererra was doing in the 1960s. With ample cover in the center of defense, he would allow left back Giacinto Facchetti license to push on and join in the attack.

Michael Cox has written in his Zonal Marking blog of teams using a more modern version of a sweeper whose positioning is different to that of the traditional deep lying sweeper. He suggests the modern version of a sweeper is a defensive center midfielder that plays in front of a four man defense with attacking outside backs. When his team is in possession, this holding midfielder drops into the center of defense while the two center backs move wide on either side of him, forming a back three. This gives the two outside backs the freedom to push into the attacking third without leaving only two center backs to defend any counters that may spring. Barcelona have used this system to great effect with Sergio Busquets dropping between center backs Carles Puyol and Gerard Pique, allowing Dani Alves and Erica Abidal (now Jordi Alba) to get into very attacking positions. I highly recommend this article from Cox if you want a more detailed explanation on the use of this more modern sweeper system. Jonathan Wilson also wrote a fascinating piece on this subject for the Guardian back in 2010 that you can see here. 

Although both Barcelona and Juventus's systems represent modern day versions of sweeper systems, they're quite different in style and philosophy. The defense in Juventus's 3-5-2 sits deeps, invites the opposition to get forward, then looks to spring quick counters. Barcelona's defense makes the field compact by holding a very high line while the 6 attacking players press the ball. Their attack is focused on ball retention and dominating possession. Both employ three at the back with fullbacks providing width high up the field when in possession, but they differ in where on the field they like to do their defending and the importance placed on keeping the ball. These two teams offer a stark example of how systems fairly similar in defensive shape can be quite different in practice.

Preview: Arsenal vs. Chelsea

Possible Lineup :

Both sides will likely start in their normal 4-2-3-1 formations. Aaron Ramsey was brought into the Arsenal lineup last weekend against Manchester City on the right although his positioning was quite narrow, creating what was effectively a four man central midfield for Arsenal. This enabled Arsenal to control possession in the middle of the park in an impressive 1-1 draw at the Etihad and Wenger may look to stick with the young Welshman Saturday. Width will come from Podolski on the left and when Arsenal look to break it will likely be through him and Cazorla. Vermaelen is expected to be back in the side after illness sidelined him last weekend. Koscielny therefore will likely be relegated back to the bench despite a goal and an overall impressive performance at Manchester City.

Chelsea's starting XI is a bit more difficult to predict. Roberto Di Matteo has preferred Oscar in the center attacking midfield role in Chelsea's last two games, a 1-0 win over Stoke and a 2-2 Champions League draw with Juventus. Oscar was brought into the side against Juventus to defend Andrea Pirlo in his deep lying creative midfield role. Pirlo is tremendous at dictating the tempo of games and getting defenses out of position with his passing- by tasking Oscar with man marking him, RDM was looking to unsettle Juventus and prevent them from getting into any type of offensive rhythm. In Mikel Arteta, Arsenal have a creative deep lying midfielder similarly gifted at dictating the tempo of games. RDM may well use a similar strategy as he did against Juventus, unsettling Arsenal by using Oscar to keep him off the ball. If Oscar does get the nod at center attacking midfield, expect Hazard and Mata to play on either side of him. They'll drift inside and switch sides frequently. Given Hazard's dribbling ability and the relative inexperience of Arsenal right back Carl Jenkinson, look for Hazard to start on the left and try to take on Jenksinson with the dribble.

1. If Ramsey starts on the right and drifts towards the center, as he did against Manchester city, it could cause Chelsea some serious problems in midfield. It would give Arsenal a 4 v. 3 advantage in the middle of the park (Arteta, Diaby, Cazorla, Ramsey vs. Mikel, Lampard, Oscar). Mikel would likely stay close to Cazorla, Lampard would have to keep an eye on Ramsey and more than likely Oscar will stay close to Arteta to take away Arsenal's deep lying creative threat and the person who dictates tempo for the Gunners. Therefore we could see Diaby unaccounted for meaning he'll have the space to make those powerful runs forward with the ball. The numerical advantage would also suggest Arsenal could boss the midfield and dominate possession.
2. How adventurous Ivanovic is getting forward could be another key factor. He enjoys joining in the attack but isn't particularly quick to recover when Chelsea lose possession. Therefore Chelsea can at times be susceptible to counters down the right side (last season's Champions League away defeat to Napoli is a good example). With Lucas Podolski occupying the left side for Arsenal, the Gunners have a player who tracks back and defends well but also has the pace to get in behind the opposition right back when Arsenal win possession (Arsenal's first goal against Liverpool is a perfect example). If Ivanovic is adventurous and plays high up the pitch, expect Podolski to enjoy plenty of room down the left to sprint into. If I were RDM I'd be a bit cautious with the Serbian's positioning.
   
3. If Chelsea do play deep and allow Arsenal to control possession, do Arsenal have the ability to unlock a crowded defense? So far draws to Sunderland and Stoke, Arsenal's two opponents that defended deep with two banks of four, suggest they do not. Without a ruthless finisher like Van Persie could struggle to turn dominant possession into goals.
4. Chelsea would be wise to play Hazard on the left. While Arsenal's right sided defenders Mertesacker and Jenkinson have had solid starts to the season, neither player instills the confidence in their one v. one defending ability to deal with someone as quick and clever with the dribble as Hazard. He could give those two fits. 
5. Chelsea looked desperately short of ideas last weekend when Stoke played them deep and kept their defense compact in the center of the pitch. Both Mata and Hazard like to come inside to get on the ball when they occupy wide roles so the Blues can become a bit narrow and a bit one dimensional. There's virtually no chance Arsenal will sit deep and allow the Blues to take the game to them at home (in all likelihood it'll be the other way around) but the Gunners should take note of how much Chelsea have struggled under RDM when they're forced to take the game to the opponent. They're more dangerous on the break and Arsenal should look to force them to slowly build attacks from the back.
6. Too often this season Chelsea have given the ball away cheaply and left their back four exposed to counters (John Obi Mikel's giveaway that led to Juventus's second goal in the Champions League is an obvious example). It's crucial that when Mikel and Lampard advance up the field Chelsea keep hold of the ball or Cazorla will have a field day breaking into space behind the two holding midfielders.

Links, 9/27/12 Edition

• Michael Cox: Why the hate for zonal marking?
•  "The chief criticism of defending zonally is that no one takes responsibility, an argument that misses the point entirely. Ex-coaches who persist with this line of debate are actually adopting quite a cowardly approach -- "No one takes responsibility" is a synonym for "There's no player I can blame." Ironically, it also demonstrates that they're unwilling to take responsibility themselves."

• Chris Rowland: Football and Finance, Liverpool and the top six
• " I hope I have been able to show a number of things. First, a realisation of just how catastrophically wrong things went in the years ’09/10 – ’10/11. Liverpool had turned into a club who changed managers on a yearly basis, wasted vast sums on a phantom stadium which couldn’t possibly be financed, had begun the trend of decreased transfer spending and swapped it for vast ineffective wage inflation, relying on player sales to break even."

• Jonathan Wilson: The question: How troubling is Liverpool's start
• Already there has been a marked improvement in pass completion, up from 80.9% to 86%, and from 73.24% to 78.9% in the opposition half. To put that into context, last year's figures were the best for Liverpool over a full season since Opta began collating data in 2006-07.The problem is all too familiar. Last season Liverpool converted only 9.13% of their chances, the lowest figure since Opta began producing its reports. It had been 13.59% the previous season but then Liverpool managed just 11.4 shots per game. When Liverpool finished second in 2008-09, they had 15.1 shots per game and converted 13.46% of their chances. But if 9.13% looked bad, this season's figure is far worse: a meagre 5.97%.
   

Everton 3-0 Swansea: Everton attack down left and exploit Fellaini's aerial ability

Everton used Marauane Fellaini's height advantage on dead balls and attacked almost entirely down the left through Leighton Baines and Steven Peinaar in a dominant 3-0 win over Swansea at Liberty Stadium.

David Moyes' side set out in a 4-4-1-1 with Victor Anichebe getting the start at center forward for the injured Nikica Jelavic with Fellaini tucked in behind him. Swansea played their normal 4-2-3-1 with Pablo Hernandez given the start on the right over Nathan Dyer and Leon Britton left on the subs bench.

Everton Press
Defensively, Everton pressed the Swansea back four with Anichebe, Peinaar, Fellaini, and right midfielder Kevin Mirallas. Leon Osman and Phil Neville sat deeper in the center of the midfield closer to the Toffees' back four. This created a gap between the four players pressing and the two holding midfielders but it wasn't space Swansea was able to exploit. The high pressing of Everton's four most advanced players prevented Swansea from settling into any sort of a rhythm in the attacking third of the field. The Swans completed 322 passes in the game, just 29 fewer than Everton, but only 69 of those were in the attacking third (21%). Everton were happy to allow the Swansea back four to pass the ball sideways amongst themselves and the Welsh side rarely looked like penetrating into the attacking third.

Everton Attack
Going forward, Everton focused its attack on the left side of the pitch where Baines and Peinaar combined throughout the afternoon with some tidy interchanges. The two accounted for the second and fourth most pass combinations in the game- there were 15 Baines to Peinaar combinations and 14 Peinaar to Baines combinations. Often Anichebe would drift to the left as well, overloading the right side of the Swansea defense while Fellaini would move into the center of the box, offering a dangerous physical presence to feed the ball into. The graphic below shows Everton's passes in the final third. Notice the number of those that occurred down the left hand side.

Interestingly, Everton's one goal that didn't result from a set piece came from a rare counter down the right flank. Fellaini won the ball deep in his own half and found an outlet pass to Peinaar who had drifted to the opposite side of the field. The South African found Mirallas bursting through the middle and the Belgian tucked it home.

Moyes also clearly set out to exploit Fellaini's height on set pieces, as he did in their season opening win over Manchester United. Any free kick the Toffees earned within 50 yards of the goal they'd get numbers into the box and lump it to the back post for Fellaini. Swansea had a miserable time dealing with the tall Belgian all afternoon and the tactic bore fruit for Everton in the 22nd minute when Fellaini won a high dead ball at the back post and flicked on for Anichebe who finished from 6 yards out to open the scoring. Replays showed Fellaini had clearly handled the ball into the path of Anichebe but the defending was poor from Ashley Williams to allow Fellaini to get the initial touch with his chest. The Belgian would go on to score himself in the 82nd minute, heading in another set piece from the left side at the front post.

Conclusion
Everton's four man high press prevented Swansea from getting any sort of meaningful possession in the attacking third. Swansea were entirely unable to cope with Baines and Peinaar down Everton's left side and failed to deal with aerial challenges with Fellaini. In the end the home side was fortunate it was only 3-0 as Anichebe was guilty of missing a couple of very good opportunities. Moyes will be thrilled with his side's performance as they continue their uncharacteristically bright start to the season. 

Tactics recap: Juventus 2-2 Chelsea

Most journalists and commentators will likely say this evening's 2-2 Champions League draw between Juventus and Chelsea was a fair result. In truth, the west Londoners were probably a bit fortunate to emerge with the home point on the balance play. Chelsea opened a two goal first half lead through a pair of Oscar goals inside two minutes of each other. However, after drawing a goal back late in the first half through Arturo Vidal, the Italian side dominated the second and although they finished the game with fewer shots on goal, they generally looked more threatening going forward. Chelsea looked vulnerable to balls played in behind the back four throughout the evening and ultimately conceded the equalizer when Fabio Quagliarella was able to time his run and finish a break away to complete the two goal comeback.

Both teams lined up in their usual formations- Juventus set out in a 3-5-2 while Chelsea opted for a 4-2-3-1. Chelsea, reacting to the creative threat of Andrea Pirlo from the base of the Juventus midfield, made one significant lineup change we've not seen from the Blues thus far. Oscar was brought in to play centrally just behind Torres, making his first Chelsea start, while Eden Hazard was shifted to the left. Oscar is a better tackler than Hazard and more used to being given some defensive responsibility. Roberto Di Matteo clearly told the young Brazilian to remain close to Pirlo to deny Juventus the distribution channel of their most clever passer. Oscar performed the task well. Pirlo never really had a huge impact on the game.

With Juventus's narrow center back three, Chelsea were able to enjoy some success in the first half when Hazard and Ramires were able to get the ball in the channels behind Juve's wing backs Stephan Lichtsteiner and Kwaswo Asamoah. When the wing backs were able to track back Ramires and Hazard, the Chelsea wide players were able to drift inside and create space for unmarked overlapping runs from outside backs Ashley Cole and Branislav Ivanovic. The problems for Chelsea came when they got the ball in these areas and needed to find a penetrating pass. All three of Juventus's center backs were able to stay narrow near their 18 yard box and usually had only Fernando Torres to worry about defending. Asking Torres to get on the end of a cross or through ball in a 1 v. 3 situation was a difficult ask and the Spaniard had a frustrating night. Oscar's goals were from solid individual efforts but weren't attributable to Chelsea's tactics.

With Pirlo largely taken out of the game by Oscar, Juventus were forced to get their attacks started elsewhere. They enjoyed success from two main channels. With two forwards, Juve were able to occupy both Chelsea center backs. Mirko Vucinic would check back deeper to the ball, forcing one Chelsea center back to follow him and allowing Sebastian Giovinco to move laterally into the space created Vucinic. Giovinco had a poor game and was ultimately subbed for Quaglierella. Quaglierella continued making these lateral runs into space and ultimately got in behind Chelsea's defense and converted a 1 v. 1 with Cech. Juve's other main attacking threat came from their more advanced center midfielders Vidal and Claudio Marchisio. The two were able to make darting runs into towards the 18 that Frank Lampard and John Obi Mikel had a nightmare of a time dealing with. The combined well for Juventus's opening goal.

Chelsea were also particularly poor at keeping possession in the second half. They wanted to sit deep and keep possession to kill the clock off but through a combination of Juventus's higher pressing and their own sloppiness they struggled to ever dictate the tempo. Mikel's giveaway that led to Juve's second goal is noteworthy but he was hardly the only one guilty of squandering possession.

The Italians will be more pleased with the away point but they were the more impressive side throughout the bulk of the match.

Thoughts on USA 1-0 Jamaica

The US looked impressive in the first half of their crucial 1-0 win over Jamaica last night in World Cup qualifying and kept a good enough defensive shape in a nervy final half hour to hold on for the three points. Despite failing to score in the opening 45 minutes, the US dominated possession with 79 percent and created a number of fine scoring opportunities. They struck the woodwork three times and forced decent saves from Jamaican goalkeeper Dwayne Miller. The breakthrough came via a Herculez Gomez freekick in the 55th minute. In truth Miller should have made the save, but the US had been good value for their lead.

Jurgen Klinsmann made five changes to the side that started in Kingston Friday evening. Right back Steve Cherundolo returned from a calf strain to replace Michael Parkhurst, Carlos Bocanegra replaced Clarence Goodson at center back, and Danny Williams, Graham Zusi and Jose Torres were brought into the midfield while Kyle Beckerman and Maurice Edu sat. Dempsey was moved forward to a withdrawn forward position behind Herculez Gomez, demoting Jozy Altidore to the bench.

The US played something like a 4-1-3-1 with Williams playing as a holding midfielder behind Zusi, Jones, and Torres and Dempsey operating just behind Gomez. Zusi brought width and a direct vertical threat down the right, while Torres brought composed passing on the left. He also frequently drifted inside to offer an additional passing option for Williams and Jones. Both outside backs in Cherundolo and Fabian Johnson did a fine job overlapping into space when Torres and Zusi came inside. The US looked particularly threatening down the right side with combinations between Zusi and Cherundolo, though the Hanover 96 captain struggled with his final ball.

Jamaica's defense sat particularly deep, often keeping all four defenders within 12 yards of the goal when the US were in the final third. Their deep line created a great deal of space for the US just outside the 18 and the Americans looked dangerous when they made delayed runs into this area (recall Danny Williams' strike that struck the post and Zusi's volley blasted over the bar came from this area). Their movement was fluid and they were able to penetrate gaps in the Jamaican defense with relative ease. That they failed to score despite such an overwhelmingly dominant first half came down to a combination of good goalkeeping, bad luck, and poor finishing.

Perhaps fittingly, the US's revenge came in the form of a freekick, the area of the game the Jamaicans had executed so well to shock the Americans in Kingston. After going down a goal, Jamaica committed more men forward and pressed the US higher up the field. In response, the US began playing much more direct. Faced with the threat of the pacey Jamaicans aggressively closing in on the ball, Klinsmann could be seen on the sideline frantically urging his back four and midfielders to knock the ball long into the corners.

This wasn't a time-wasting strategy the US was employing to kill the clock off; they were doing it with 25 minutes still remaining. Given Klinsmann expressed desire to Latinize American soccer and the success the US had in possession in the first half (they finished the half with 79 percent possession), it seemed a little surprising that Klinsmann would resort to hitting long balls for the forward to chase while keeping a tidy defensive shape with the other players.

However, the strategy made perfect sense. At no point in the course of three halves of soccer had Jamaica shown they could break down a compact US defense in the run of play. They simply don't have the technically ability to break down a team defending with two banks of four. By playing long balls into Jamaica's defensive third, Klinsmann was minimizing the ability of the Jamaicans to force turnovers in midfield and counter at the US defense with numbers. Even if Herculez Gomez (and then Jozy Altidore) was unable to get on the end of these long balls, the US was still forcing Jamaica to patiently build from the back against a crowded defense. In effect, they were forcing Jamaica to rely on their technical ability rather than their athleticism to get an equalizer. Despite a nervous-looking finish, the Jamaicans only really troubled Howard once.

The decision of Klinsmann to move to a more direct and defensive setup after getting the go-ahead goal also signals that he's not entirely confident in his team's ability to kill off games by knocking the ball around and preventing the opponent from getting possession (the way a team like Spain would see out an important game). He was clearly concerned about giving the ball away cheaply in midfield and giving the Jamaicans opportunities to counter. That's a concern I shared and given the US's precarious position in the group going into the game, minimizing risk seemed a wise move.

A conversation on US tactics under Klinsmann and Bradley

Between the U.S. Men's National Team's away  loss to Jamaica last Friday (September 7) and tonight's match versus Jamaica in Columbus, Ohio, Daniel and I exchanged several emails discussing what went wrong in Kingston and what tactical changes the team has adopted under Klinsmann. A lightly edited version of the email conversation follows.

Daniel: I'm frankly confused as to what the thinking behind the US tactics was. Why press against Jamaica? They don't pass the ball out of the back; they just hoof it forward. Pressing isn't going to disrupt their build up. Instead, the US players are just worse off in terms of their defensive positioning. The strangest part is when Jamaica had possession in their attacking half and even third, the US continued with a press. Jamaica are weak in possession. Why not sit back, defend with two banks of four, and let the Jamaicans make the error? The result of the US pressing to try to force errors was, of course, conceding free kicks in dangerous positions. I know a lot of people, myself included, complained about Bob Bradley. His tactics might not have been terribly exciting, but they were pragmatic and made sense in Concacaf qualifying. Jurgen Klinsmann seems either naive or idealistic.

Kyle: Surely not idealistic. I thought Klinsmann said in numerous interviews he changed the team's shape based on the players available and the opposition. That suggests pragmatism to me. Did the US play ugly under Bradley? For some reason my memories are of the US scoring a lot and conceding a lot.

Daniel: I think the primary difference between the US style of play under Bradley and under Klinsmann is that the team are more likely to press under Klinsmann. I don't think the play is any prettier though. Bradley definitely preferred a 4-4-2, and that also seems to be the formation that Klinsmann has settled on. Though Klinsmann sometimes plays more of a 4-4-1-1 than a 4-4-2, and a 4-4-1-1 can morph into a 4-2-3-1 depending how high the wide players are. But, I am honestly struggling to remember how the US played under Bradley so who knows!

Kyle: What would you call the formation in the Jamaica game? 4-3-1-2? 4-3-2-1? 4-3-3? I guess they're all the same. It was a lineup void of creativity, but on paper seems like the perfect one to retain a one goal lead for 90 minutes. Playing three central midfielders, all of whom are known more for their tackling and/or defensive positioning than their creativity, in theory, seems like a formation designed to prevent the opposition from scoring. The way that formation was actually employed was a different story, and I'm not so sure what the actual plan was. I think the 4-3-3 could have been fine had it been executed a little differently. Jamaica's outside midfielders were not threatening--at no point did they show they could put a dangerous ball in the box--so I thought keeping the defense compact in the center of the field was fine. However, the weird pressing thing where certain guys were chasing the ball and others were playing deep created space between the seams for Jamaican players to receive the ball and get fouled. We know how that turned out. The positioning was downright bizarre.

Daniel: I think the US were trying to play a 4-4-2 with a diamond midfield. I admittedly didn't watch the first half, but from what I read, Beckerman was sitting at the bottom of the diamond. When I tuned in for the second half, it looked more like the US were playing, as you suggested, a 4-3-1-2. That's a pretty subtle distinction and possibly a distinction without a difference. From what I saw, Dempsey rarely defended behind the ball. He would sometimes press the Jamaican midfielders from behind, but it seemed like the US defended with a bank of four (the back four) and a bank of three (the three midfielders at the bottom and sides of the diamond). To be clear, I am not trying to blame Dempsey; it's pretty obvious that his instructions were not to defend behind the ball.

As most everyone noticed, the US midfield three (if I say midfield three, I am excluding Dempsey) seemed to pressure the Jamaican players on the ball in our own defensive half and third to try to force a turnover rather than containing, maintaining a disciplined defensive shape, and waiting for the Jamaicans to make an error.

However, I am undecided as to whether the low press by the US midfield three was the cause of the problem or only a symptom of the problem. That is, were the three midfielders told to apply pressure on the player with the ball, or did they press because of the large gaps between the players in the bank of three? If a wide attacking player cuts to the inside, Edu (who was playing on the right) and Jones (on the left) may have felt like they had to close the player down otherwise the gap was large enough between them and Beckerman that the attacking player could easily split them. That wouldn't explain Beckerman pressing from a more central position, though from the short period of time that I saw him play, he didn't seem to be pressing nearly as much as Jones and Edu.

It is obviously considerably more difficult to defend with a bank of three than a bank of four, but it's criminal to defend with a bank of three and not be compact. Jones and Edu were usually positioned very wide, which left gaping holes between the three members of the midfield bank. If a team wants to defend with a bank of three in front of a bank of four, in all likelihood the outside backs will sometimes need to step up towards the bank of three to fill in the gaps in the wide areas. Because Jones and Edu were playing so wide, this couldn't happen, and instead gaps existed more centrally. Jones and Edu attempted to fill these gaps by pressuring players on the ball, but their pressure resulted in conceding free kicks in dangerous central areas rather than turnovers leading to dangerous counterattacks.

In sum, three interrelated factors seemed to contribute to the US defensive problems: (1) defending with a bank of four and a bank of three rather than the safer option of two banks of four, (2) the lack of compactness in the midfield bank of three, and (3) the pressing by the players in the bank of three that resulted in conceding set pieces in dangerous areas.

Kyle: That does make sense. I don't think you'll find too many examples of teams out there keeping three players in front of the ball and defending against a team playing with two center midfielders and two wide midfielders (that's what Jamaica were doing right?). It's always going to be difficult for a midfield three to cover the width of the field. Like you said, in that formation, you'd think it's the job of the midfield three to stay compact and shift as a unit. I don't think there is much of a problem if, say, Edu moves towards to the right sideline to close down the left-sided midfielder in possession as long Beckerman and Jones rotate that way as well to offer cover balance. Then it becomes the job of the left back to step forward from the back four and a little bit central to take away the threat of the big switch to the right midfielder (which you mention above).

I'm afraid we've discussed tactics more here than Klinsmann has with the team following the loss. All the solutions he's discussed with the media seem like they'd be quite obvious to a professional player: "move the ball quicker," "keep possession," "don't foul around the 18," "be patient." Of course those are all things that may help you win a game, but they don't get to the root of the problem which for me was team shape.

Daniel: Yeah, it's a meaningless answer to say "we need to keep the ball better" when asked what a team needs to improve upon. The real question is what you are going to do in order to keep the ball better. (Admittedly, they did say that they need to play simpler, short passes.) Like you, I frankly wasn't that concerned about their possession. Considering the lineup they fielded (which made sense given the personnel available and that this was an away World Cup qualifier in which a draw would have been an acceptable outcome) and the quality of the pitch, the US were never going to dominate possession. Again, as you noted, the team shape was much more problematic than possession.

Recap: Chelsea 4-2 Reading

Despite another impressive performance from new signing Eden Hazard, Chelsea struggled mightily to break down Reading's crowded defense and were extremely fortunate to emerge 4-2 winners. Just as they often did last year, Chelsea found it difficult to create meaningful goalscoring opportunities when the opposition allowed them to have the bulk of possession and forced them to patiently pick apart seams against two defensive banks of four. The Blues finished the game with just under 72% of possession but only had 7 shots on goal. Four of those shots were goals but the first was a penalty, the second came off a serious goalkeeping blunder, the third was clearly offsides, and the fourth came late when Reading's keeper had gone forward to attack a corner kick.

Chelsea's problem in breaking down compact defenses last season was largely due to the fact Juan Mata was the only creative passer in the Chelsea attack. As I mentioned in my preview to this game in the previous post, the strength's of their other advanced midfielders/wide forwards in the 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-3 systems last season- Kalou, Sturridge and Ramires- were mainly pace and the ability to advance the ball forward with the dribble. None of the three are exceptional passers. Chelsea's deeper lying midfielders last season, Meireles, Mikel and Lampard, were not of the deep lying creator mold of a Luka Modric, Xabi Alonso, or Andrea Pirlo. Meireles is a hardworking ball winner, Mikel is a very defensive holding player, and Lampard keeps the ball moving and makes well timed runs into the box but none are known for springing attacks with their clever passing. Thus, Chelsea were left with Mata as the sole player with the creativity to cut apart a defense with a vertical pass. As a result, against compact defenses Chelsea would play horizontal balls in midfield all afternoon without ever posing much of a penetrative threat. It was methodical, predictable and easy to defend.


Hazard is a player capable of penetrating the center of compact defenses both with the dribble and with creative forward passes. He brings to the side a directness they lacked in the center of the park last season. He's not content simply keeping the ball moving from side to side but instead likes to go to goal and attack vertically. He proved incredibly effective yesterday, getting into dangerous pockets of space between the seams of the Reading defense and completing 38 of 41 attempted passes in the attacking third (two of which were assists, see the figure below).  Just as they had at Wigan Sunday, Hazard and Mata interchanged between central and wide positions, with Mata given the freedom to come infield to collect the ball. The pair combined for the two highest pass combinations of the match with 18 Hazard to Mata combinations and 18 Mata to Hazard combinations.

With Hazard and Mata orchestrating moves forward Chelsea's struggles yesterday, unlike last season, had less to do with an absence of creativity and more to do with a lack of pace in their ball movement. At 72%, Chelsea had Barcelona-like possession stats but unlike Barcelona, who rapidly move the ball from player to player, they seemed too often to take an extra unnecessary touch, allowing Reading to comfortably rotate their defensive shape. They were also uncharacteristically loose in possession, Ramires particularly guilty of some untidy first touches and passes. Hazard was exceptional in possession but once he got rid of the ball the pace of Chelsea's movement stalled. As the second half progressed with Chelsea trailing 2-1, everything went through Hazard and Mata, with the Spaniard continuing to get in central positions in an effort to get on the ball more. As a result their shape became a bit narrow with the Blues trying to force the ball through the crowded center of Reading's defense. The figure below shows Juan Mata's second half passes in the attacking third. Notice how many of these passes came from central areas, specifically ones just outside the 18 yard box. The two were dangerous on the ball in these crowded pockets of space but Chelsea were struggling to stretch the Reading defense laterally by making threatening runs from wide areas.

The introduction of Sturridge gave the Blues needed width on the right and a new point from which to attack. Prior to his introduction Chelsea's only point of attack was through the middle and thus the center of Reading's defense was able to stay compact and simply check the runs and close the passing lanes of Torres, Mata and Hazard. With Chelsea offering little threat from the right, left back Ian Harte was able to pinch inside and provide additional cover through the middle. Sturridge's introduction forced Harte to defend wider on the right, leaving one less defender to provide cover in the box. Immediately Sturridge was able to use his pace to get around the much slower left back and cut in towards the front post. The threat of him cutting inside from the right left Reading's center backs with an additional concern- not only did they have to check runs coming from the center, an area Chelsea were trying to overload with Mata, Hazard, Lampard and Oscar, they also had to worry about shifting to provide cover for Harte if he were beaten by Sturridge on the outside. Although Sturridge was not involved directly in the third goal, it started when Chelsea had shifted Reading's defense to the right and quickly switched the point of attack to the left allowing Ashley Cole the space to make an unchecked run from left back into Reading's weak side defense.


If yesterday proved anything for Chelsea, it was that their new look attacking outfit will almost certainly experience some hiccups as the players take time to get used to one another. Their key playmaker in Hazard has been involved in only three competitive matches with the squad and Fernando Torres, the only true center forward at the club with whom they'll rely on heavily for goals, was very much a peripheral figure at the club last season. However, there have been hints of what could prove to be a bright future at Stamford Bridge as well, particularly from Hazard and Mata. The two have shown a good understanding of one another in the first two league fixtures and their ability to interchange positions and overload different areas of the field should cause serious matchup issues for opposition defenses. Against teams that pack the defense as Reading did yesterday, Chelsea will need to offer a point of attack from wide areas as Mata and Hazard both move centrally to try to use their combination passing. Wide threats will stretch the opposition defense and allow the two creative players the space to play clever through balls as they did for Chelsea's game-winning third goal yesterday.

Reading will offer Chelsea different challenge than Wigan

Chelsea's rather comfortable 2-0 win in their opening fixture at Wigan offered a display of the pragmatic efficiency the club has become associated with in the years since Jose Mourinho's arrival. After snatching both goals in the opening 7 minutes, the Blues were content to sit deep, absorb pressure with a compact defense and very cautiously move forward. Wigan had 52 percent of the possession, controlled 58 percent of the territory, and completed 113 passes in the final third to Chelsea's 44. Frank Lampard led Chelsea with 8 passes in the final third--7 Wigan players had as many or more passes in the final third. Despite dominating many of the offensive statistics, the Latics rarely looked like threatening Petr Cech's goal, and throughout the 90 minutes the result never appeared to be in doubt. It was hardly the kind of Barcelona-esque, stylish possession-based performance Roman Abramovich wants from Chelsea but the win was as easy they come.

In many ways the possession-based attacking philosophy of Wigan under Roberto Martinez plays directly into what proved to be Chelsea's strengths late last season--sitting deep and drawing opposition midfielders and full backs forward, then regaining possession and countering into the space they left vacated. Chelsea were much less comfortable when forced to unlock compact defenses with tidy possession and clever buildup play. Even against superior opposition Wigan are not a team that sits back and defends in banks of four with ten men behind the ball. Indeed, they used the same brave 3-4-3 formation Sunday that they used during their terrific late season run last year. They like to get on the ball and get numbers into the opposition half (evidenced by their dominance of passes in the final third). Inevitably that leaves them vulnerable to quick counter attacks which proved to be Wigan's undoing Sunday.

In the second minute Wigan advanced the ball into the attacking third through an impressive interchange of passes between right wing back Anderson Boyce and right forward Victor Moses down the sideline. Boyce then played the ball to Franco Di Santo about 24 yards from goal in the middle of the pitch. Shaun Maloney had drifted centrally from his left forward position, forcing right back Branislav Ivanovic to track his run for Chelsea. Maloney's clever movement left acres of space down the left flank for Maynor Figueroa to run into from his left wing back position. The movement was impressive from the Latics, but Di Santo was caught in possession before he could find Figueroa, leaving both wing backs high up the field and out of defensive position. Ivanovic collected the ball at Chelsea's 18, played a short pass to Juan Mata and took off into the space left vacated by Figeueroa. Two passes later and Eden Hazard had turned away from Ivan Ramis brilliantly, leaving Wigan's other two center backs hopelessly exposed. He found Ivanovic to his right who tucked the finish away coolly. Wigan had been undone in the blink of an eye by four quick passes. The buildup that led to Hazard winning the penalty that made it 2-0 was similar. Figueroa advanced to the touchline before hitting a poor cross directly to Cech. Cech quickly rolled the ball to Lampard who was left with acres of space down the middle to dribble into. Hazard drifted right into the space left empty by Figueroa's attacking run. He received a pass from Lampard, advanced the ball into the box and was ultimately hacked down by Ramis. Two quick counter attacks had effectively killed the game off inside 10 minutes.

Reading at Stamford Bridge will likely offer Chelsea a very different kind of challenge. Whereas Wigan bravely attacked with numbers and left themselves susceptible to the counter, Reading is expected to get bodies behind the ball and get into a compact defensive shape before looking to spring counterattacks of their own. Under Brian McDermott, Reading are an extremely organized outfit and conceded the fewest goals in the Championship last season. Chelsea will be forced to patiently keep possession and provide the creativity to unlock a crowded defense, something they struggled with at times last season. The addition of Hazard should certainly help in this regard. Last season Chelsea's wide outside forward and attacking midfield options were mainly Mata, Daniel Sturridge, Salomon Kalou and Ramires. Of those four, only Mata is known for his creative passing ability. Kalou, Ramires, and Sturridge are known for their pace and ability to advance the ball with the dribble but aren't especially technical players. Their skill sets mean they are more suited to playing a counter attacking style where they can run at defenders with pace rather than one centered around patient buildup play. Hazard is a player with good technique who brings both the ability to beat opponents off the dribble and to unlock them with a clever pass. Having two technical players behind Torres should make Chelsea a more threatening and unpredictable side when they come up against crowded defenses. The positioning and movement of those two today should be one of the more intriguing tactical elements of the match.

It will be interesting to see if Roberto Di Matteo's team sheet is influenced by the fact that Chelsea play three games in the opening seven days of the season. They face a strong Newcastle side at the Bridge Saturday. It's possible Di Matteo could opt to rest a usual starter or two in the hopes they'll be able to defeat an inferior Reading side today without a first choice 11. Look for Reading to try to frustrate Chelsea by limiting their space to move the ball in the attacking third and crowding the box. If Chelsea get an early goal they should cruise.

Goalkeeper distribution trends limited in their ability to predict successful tactics in MLS

At the end of May, Peter Brownell wrote a blog post for Opta Sports that looked at data on the percentages MLS goalkeepers played the ball long versus short in the 2011 MLS season. The table above is from Brownell's original posting and shows goalkeeper distribution trends from that season for each MLS team. While his data set is interesting, Brownell uses it to arrive at some suspect suggestions about what are the most successful tactics for MLS teams to employ.


He starts off the article noting that American soccer is known for the speed and athleticism of its players over their technical merits on the ball. I'd agree with this point. He uses this bit of information to hypothesize that goalkeepers in MLS will more often than not select to hit long fifty-fifty balls rather than going short and forcing a team to advance the ball with patient buildup from the back.

Indeed, his data backs that hypothesis. MLS goalkeepers elected to play the ball long 58% of the time. Only three teams played the ball short more than long- Chivas USA, Toronto FC, and the New York Red Bulls. He points out that these three teams all had relatively disappointing seasons. Chivas USA and Toronto FC finished in 8th place out of 9 teams in their respective divisions and the New York Red Bulls squeaked into the playoffs in 5th place and were disposed of quickly by the LA Galaxy. Brownell unconvincingly uses these three teams' lack of success to suggest that the best tactics for MLS teams may be to forgo the defense altogether and launch long balls from the goalkeeper. He says,

This suggests, perhaps, that playing out of the back in MLS 2011 might not have been the most fruitful strategy.  One theory to explain this is the idea that MLS players are not technical enough to competently build long, calculated passing sequences.  This is not a slight at the technique of MLS players, but rather trumpets the physically superior MLS rosters.  MLS players are athletes who are fast and fit, bring intense pressure, and close down backs quickly.  As a result, teams like Toronto FC and Red Bull New York turn the ball over in their defensive thirds and give up cheap goals (watch Tim Ream's gaffes against the Philadelphia Union and Real Salt Lake for proof).

By implementing a 4-3-3 and trying to play the beautiful game beautifully, Aaron Winter (Toronto FC's manager) is fighting a losing battle.  The numbers say so at least.  It is easier, safer, and more reliable to forget the backline, smash the ball forward and attempt to win the territorial battle.  Getting big-bodied strikers and midfielders into the box and battling for set-pieces is regarded as ugly soccer, but it can bear results.

Brownell fails however to mention the relative lack of success in the league of teams at the other end of his table, those that elected to play long from the keeper the highest percentage of times. Of the five teams that played the ball long from the keeper the most, only Columbus made the playoffs and they were beaten in the opening round. His suggestion that patient buildup from the back may not be the most fruitful strategy for MLS teams would be much better supported by possession data. While the percentage of balls played long from the keeper may be indicative of the importance a team places on keeping possession, I don't think that stat in and of itself is very telling in explaining a team's success. After all, how many goals begin with moves that start from the goalkeeper? I'd guess that the vast majority of the time goals come from intercepting the ball from the opposition, not from a team's own keeper.

I do think Brownell's data could be put to good use since I believe how often a team plays long from the goalkeeper is a good indicator of how much importance they place on winning the possession battle. It would be interesting to see how Brownell's data correlated to average possession data in MLS and then how average possession data correlated to league success. This information would be more telling of whether direct or possession-style tactics created more successful teams.