Second half width key in Chelsea win over Fulham

In the opening 45 minutes of Chelsea's 2-0 home win Saturday over Fulham, Jose Mourinho's side looked predictable and short on ideas. Under Martin Jol, Fulham set out to defend deep in compact banks of four and play on the counter, a strategy that will be taken by the bulk of opposing sides that will visit Stamford Bridge this season.

Jol's side deserves credit for their first half performance. Center midfielders Scott Parker and Steve Sidwell were disciplined and stayed tight to their center backs, allowing little space in between the lines where Chelsea's gifted attacking midfielders thrive.

However, Chelsea's overreliance on cutting back in towards the middle of the pitch when they got the ball in wide areas made Fulham's defensive duties too easy. Time and again Eden Hazard and Andre Schurrle received the ball in wide positions and looked to cut inside rather than beat their defender to the end line and hit a ball across the face of goal. Mourinho has always liked his wide players to be able to cut into the middle and shoot which is why he tends to to use right footed players on the left wing and left footed players on the right wing. In the first half on Saturday Hazard, Schurrle and Oscar rotated between the three attacking midfield positions but all three looked to bring the ball inside when they received it on the flanks.

While having players that can cut inside and either have a shot or combine for short passing combinations is often quite useful, it tends to be a more effective strategy when the game is open and there is space in the middle of the pitch for wide players to cut into. With Fulham defending deep and quite narrow, there simply wasn't this space for Hazard and particularly Schurrle to drift into. Every time they attempted to cut inside Parker and Sidwell were there to meet them and force a speculative short pass in a very tight area. 

In the second half Chelsea didn't rotate the attacking midfield three. Schurrle played on the left, Hazard the right and Oscar through the middle. Both Schurrle and Hazard maintained much wider positions than they had in the first half. Schurrle in particular hugged the left touch line throughout the second half. By stretching the play laterally, Chelsea forced Fulham to defend the width of the pitch and created wider gaps in their defensive and midfield lines of four.

Schurrle's wide positioning forced Fulham right back Sascha Reither into a decision- if he drifted wide towards Schurrle he became disconnected from his center back Brede Hangeland and left space in behind him for Samuel Eto'o to drift into. If he stayed tight with Hangeland it meant leaving Schurrle with space in the channel. On Chelsea's opening goal, Reither opted for the second option, staying tight with Hangeland to help out on Eto'o. As a result, Hazard was able to play a simple pass to an unmarked Schurrle on the left channel (shown below). For the first time in the game Schurrle gets to the end line rather than cutting inside and strikes a ball towards the front post. Fulham keeper David Stockdale should have dealt with it before Oscar was able to tuck it home. Still, Chelsea's use of width had left Fulham more stretched defensively than they'd been at any point in the first half.

Reither helps with Eto'o, allowing Schurrle space down the channel

A few minutes later Reither was again forced into a decision on where to position himself when Schurrle drifted to the touch line. This time he moved into a wider position to get tighter to the German winger. As a result, Eto'o (just to the right of the screen grab shown below) was able to run into the space behind Reither down the left channel and collect a long pass from Mikel. The move only resulted in a scuffed Chelsea shot but the Blues were suddenly finding more pockets of space in the final third as they began stretching Fulham laterally.

This time Reither stays tighter to Schurrle on touchline, allows Eto'o space to drift in behind and receive long pass from Mikel

 I don't mean to advocate that wide midfielders should always stay in the channels and look to get to the end line to hit crosses into the box. Yesterday I posted on how Manchester United's use of two out and out wingers in Ashley Young and Antonio Valencia made them far too predictable and unable to create chances through the middle in their heavy derby defeat Sunday to Manchester City. Rather I'm suggesting that variety and balance are the keys to creating scoring chances. Manchester City provide a good example of attacking balance in their derby win. Nasri tucked inside to provide 3 v. 2 overloads for City in central areas while Jesus Navas stayed wide on the right to provide width. Chelsea seemed closer to finding that balance in the second half against Fulham but still clearly have work to do.

Tactical Analysis: Machester City 4-1 Manchester United

Looking back over the team sheets following Manchester City's 4-1 dismantling yesterday of Manchester United, I wondered if I should have been feeling as surprised as I was. There was a marked gulf in individual talent between the two sides, made all the more pronounced by Robin Van Persie's injury absence. Under Sir Alex Ferguson, United were nearly always better than the sum of their parts, largely because of SAF's ability to adjust his tactics to the opposition at hand. That may well yet happen under David Moyes but it isn't the case now. On Sunday City exposed United for what they were- a squad of good players up against a squad of mostly great ones.

Kompany closes down Rooney
City were much more dynamic in midfield and dominated as a result. Both teams played 4-4-2 with a withdrawn forward- Rooney for United and Aguero for City- playing off a more advanced #9- Welbeck and Negredo. As a result of both squads playing with two forwards, the battle in the middle of midfield was 2 v. 2- Fernandinho and Toure vs. Carrick and Fellaini. Both pairs of center midfielders would step towards one another defensively, leaving space between the lines in behind them.

In just the second minute of play Rooney was able to exploit this space, dropping off the City center backs and collecting a pass from Carrick with loads of room in front of him to run at the defense. He powered forward and slipped a menacing ball through to Welbeck but a poor first touch and slip let him down. You can see Rooney in space between the lines as the pass is being played to him by Carrick in the image below.

Fernandinho and Toure step towards Carrick and Fellaini- Rooney with too much space between the seams early on.

After allowing Rooney in that much space between the lines, City adapted their defensive shape, opting to have Kompany follow Rooney's runs into midfield and deny him the time to turn with the ball. The strategy was meant to prevent the England forward from collecting possession with the space to run at the defense and play penetrating balls through to Welbeck. At one point Kompany tracked Rooney 15 yards into United's half of the field.

While the strategy helped City in making Rooney less of a threat in the midfield gaps, it should have also opened up space for Welbeck to make diagonal runs into the space left open by Kompany's tracking. In the screen shot below, you can see the space in behind Kompany for Welbeck to make the diagonal run into. However, he fails to adequately react to Kompany's positioning and make the correct run. It's the type of run you'd almost certainly see Van Persie making.

Welbeck needs to be making the diagonal run in behind indicated by the yellow arrow when Kompany steps out to close down Rooney.

Nasri tucks inside
They key offensively for City was the positioning of Samir Nasri. He continually tucked inside from a starting position on the left- a role typically played by the injured David Silva. Nasri's movement into central areas achieved two things for City. Because the center midfield battle was 2 v. 2, it gave City a 3 v. 2 advantage in the middle of pitch and allowed them to control possession high up the field. It also opened up space for Aleksander Kolarov to overlap down the left wing from his fullback position.

City's opener came when Nasri collected possession down the left, ran at Chris Smalling and bought Kolarov enough time to make the overlapping run around the outside. Valencia's tracking of Kolarov was surprisingly poor and the Serbian left back was able to cross unimpeded for Aguero to tuck home.

Nasri was again involved for City's third goal. He again collected possession on the left and carried the ball in field. Kolarov made an overlapping run, forcing Smalling to follow him into a wide position and opening up space for Negredo to make a diagonal run towards the near post. Nasri picked him out with a well weighted pass before Negredo turned Vidic and crossed for Aguero to tap in. Fellaini should have either tracked the deep run of Aguero or given a shout to Ferdinand that Aguero was bursting in behind him.

City's fourth goal summed up both their own ruthlessness in the final third and United's incompetency in the same area. At one end of the pitch Ashley Young cheaply gave away possession on the edge of City's penalty area after Evra had gotten forward to overlap. Negredo was able to dart into the space down the right channel left vacated by Evra and collect an outlet pass from Kompany. He proceeded to dribble 60 yards to the end line unchallenged before playing a perfectly looped cross for Nasri to volley in.

United lack creativity
With Rooney being pressed by Kompany, United desperately lacked creativity elsewhere. They could have used a wide player like Nasri to tuck inside from the channels and provide an extra creative passer in the middle of the pitch. Young and Valencia are both out and out wingers that like to maintain wide positions and deliver crosses. United had probably set up to counter down the channels, as they had in big away fixtures last season, but the strategy simply wasn't working. With both Young and Valencia in the game, there's not enough creativity on the pitch to get in any sort of attacking rhythm when the counter isn't on. Moyes of course does have an incredibly creative attacking midfielder he could use wide on the left in Shinji Kagawa. Moyes used the Japanese international in United's midweek Champions League fixture home to Bayer Leverkusen and probably got it wrong not using him again here.

Conclusion
In the end 4-1 was no less than City deserved. While Rooney was excellent, Kompany's close tracking of him meant he had fewer opportunities to run at the defense and cause problems. United lacked anyone else to link play forward to Welbeck. A lack of creativity has been a recurring theme for Moyes' side at the start of the season. Kagawa may be the answer but doesn't seem to be a player Moyes trusts yet.

City were impressive in their ability to stretch the United defense and create overloads. Nasri's eagerness to tuck inside gave City a man advantage in central areas and allowed Kolarov to press forward dangerously down the left.

Stark contrast between first and second half approach for Liverpool this season

Brendan Rodgers' possession philosophy is well known throughout English football. In 2010-2011, Rodgers guided Swansea to a Championship playoff victory, securing the Welsh side's first season in the top tier since 1983. The following Premier League season Swansea surprised many with their brand of fluid, possession-based football. Incredibly, they ended a successful 2011-12 campaign (they would finish 11th) third in the Premier League in average possession behind Arsenal and title winners Manchester City.

Rodgers went on to accept the managerial position at Liverpool in the spring of 2012 following the sacking of Kenny Dalglish. He worked quickly to implement his possession-focused style despite taking over a side more suited to getting the ball wide and hitting in crosses. Liverpool would jump from 7th in the league in average possession in Dalglish's final season to third in 2012-2013 under Rodgers.

It comes as a bit of a surprise then that after four games this season, Liverpool are averaging just 48% possession, good for 9th in the league. What is most startling about that statistic is the stark contrast in possession totals between the first and second halves of Liverpool's opening four games. In the opening stages of games Liverpool are playing as you would expect a Rodgers side to play- they're keeping possession and when they lose it they're pressing quickly high up the pitch to win it back. As a result, Liverpool have had at least 50% possession in the first half in all four games and are averaging 56% first half possession overall. They've by and large been battering their opponents in the opening 45 minutes. All 5 of Liverpool's goals this season have come in the first half and they've had the lead at halftime in all four games.

By contrast, Rodgers has taken a markedly different approach in the second half of games. They've focused less on retaining the ball and more on maintaining defensive shape, dropping much deeper and defending in banks of four in their own half. Whereas Liverpool have had at least 50% possession in the first half of every game, only once have they had over 50% in the second half- the opening win home to Stoke. They're averaging just 41% possession in the second halves of games.

*Stats via FourFourTwo Stats Zone iPhone app

The graphic below shows a comparison of Liverpool's tackles in the first and second half against Swansea and illustrates the change in their shape. In the first half the focus is on keeping the ball and pressing high up the pitch. Notice 4 of their 7 successful first half tackles occur in the attacking half of the field. In the second half they defend deep and all 9 of their successful tackles occur in their defensive half.

The stark contrast between first half and second half possession totals could be explained by the fact Liverpool have had the lead going into the second half in every game. It's natural for many managers to be more reactive and play more defensively when they have a second half lead to protect. However, in the past Rodgers has publicly spoken out against such an approach.

In the interview below from April 2012 (at 7:13), shortly before he took the Liverpool job, Rodgers spoke of the importance of protecting leads by keeping possession. He brings up an example early in Swansea's season of a game against leads. Swansea had a 2-0 lead going into the final five minutes. They began to hit the ball long and concede possession, thereby "inviting pressure" in the words of Rodgers. Wolves would go on to draw the game 2-2.

Rodgers goes on to explain how during the following week of training his side focused on relieving pressure by keeping hold of the ball. In the next game Swansea were faced with a similar situation leading Bolton 2-1 late on. He explains how this time his side was able to see out the win by keeping possession, stressing that "for ten minutes Bolton never got a kick of the ball."

Liverpool's second half possession figures suggest they are not looking to see out games by retaining possession. So does this indicate a change in footballing philosophy from Rodgers? That's a difficult question to answer after only four games but there are certainly a number of possible explanations as to why he's adopted a more pragmatic approach early on.

For starters, it's quite difficult to maintain the energy levels required to play a style based on possession and pressing for 90 minutes. Inevitably players tire in the second half making pressing more difficult. Defending deeper mitigates the risk of being caught on the break when players become too fatigued to press quickly.

Secondly, the attacking four players in Rodgers 4-2-3-1 formation are all quite young. He has used Coutinho, Victor Moses, Iago Aspas, Jordan Henderson and Daniel Sturridge in those four positions. Aside from Aspas, all of those players are 24 years old or younger and Aspas (26) is still adjusting to his first season in the Premier League. Perhaps Rodgers feels the relative lack of battle tested pros in attacking positions may result in possession given away cheaply too often and leave Liverpool exposed defensively.

Regardless of the reasoning, it'll be interesting to see if Rodgers sticks with this strategy of pressing and attacking relentlessly early on, then dropping deep once his side have gone ahead. It worked in their opening three fixtures- all 1-0 wins- but wasn't always terribly convincing. Too often goalkeeper Simon Mignolet was forced to bale them out with big saves. In the most recent 2-2 draw at Swansea, Liverpool had just 30% possession in the second half. This time they were unable to deal with the continuous pressure and conceded a second half equalizer.

Given that maintaining possession has been the central part of Rodgers' footballing philosophy, my guess is that as he'll want his side to control the second half of games better. However, the pressures of managing at a club as big as Liverpool in all likelihood have made Rodgers more flexible in his tactical approach.

Di Canio's 4-4-2 allows Arsenal to overwhelm Sunderland in midfield

Paolo Di Canio's decision to field a 4-4-2 enabled Arsenal to overwhelm Sunderland in the middle of midfield and were it not for some wasteful finishing from the Gunners in the first half they'd have had the game won by halftime.

Di Canio played both Jozy Altidore and Steven Fletcher up front while David Vaughan and Ki Sung-Yueng played a two man center midfield. Arsene Wenger played his normal 4-2-3-1 which meant Arsenal had a man advantage in the middle of the pitch. Mathieu Flamini was the deepest of the three center midfielders with Aaron Ramsey operating as a box-to-box shuttler and Mesut Ozil in the hole behind Olivier Giroud. With Santi Cazorla out with an ankle injury, Jack Wilshere played on the left side of Arsenal's attacking midfield three.

After Arsenal's 1-0 win in the North London Derby, Michael Cox highlighted how Cazorla had tucked inside from his starting position on the left, in effect playing as a fourth center midfielder. With Tottenham employing a 4-3-3, Cazorla tucking inside gave Arsenal a 4 v. 3 advantage in the center of the pitch. Against Tottenham's physically imposing midfield trio of Moussa Dembele, Paulinho and Etienne Capoue, the extra man in midfield enabled Arsenal to compete in central areas.

Yesterday Arsenal used a similar strategy, this time with Wilshere tucking in from the left. But rather than competing 4 v. 3 as they had against Tottenham's imposing center midfielders, they were 4 v. 2 against Vaughan and Ki, two players with nowhere near the athleticism of Dembele, Paulinho and Capoue.

Passes received by Jack Wilshere vs. Sunderland. He started on the left but was given the freedom to come inside to flood the middle of the pitch

Arsenal were therefore able to overwhelm Sunderland in the middle of the park. Flamini, Ramsey, Ozil and Wilshere were simply able to pass around Vaughan and Ki, allowing Arsenal to keep possession high up the pitch. Ozil and Ramsey received deserved praise for their excellent performances but Sunderland's two man midfield made it easy for them to find the space to pick out penetrating passes. By halftime Arsenal had completed 92 passes in the attacking third to Sunderland's 22.

Overall Passing Statistics: Sunderland vs. Arsenal

It should have been job done for Arsenal by halftime but Walcott missed two 1 v. 1 chances to make it 2-0. They would almost prove costly. Laurent Koscielny's needless 48th minute challenge on Adam Johnson in the box allowed halftime substitute Craig Gardner to level from the spot. Arsenal continued to control possession high up the pitch in the second half but, chasing a winner, the game became more open and Sunderland had their opportunities on the break. Had Walcott taken one of his first half chances Arsenal could have been more cautious in the second half and looked to play on the break as they've done this season after taking leads. Ramsey would provide a stunning game winner but the contest turned out to be a bit tighter than it should have been. Sunderland were right to feel aggrieved when referee Martin Atkinson failed to allow an advantage that led to what appeared to be a Sunderland equalizer.

Still, on the balance of play Arsenal were much the better team and looked comfortable for most of the contest. Ozil's performance suggested he won't need much transitioning into the squad or life in the Premier League and Ramsey looks to be developing into a top class box-to-box midfielder.

Future opponents of Arsenal should take note of just how much they can dominate a game when up against just two opposition center midfielders. With their gifted passers and tendency to flood the middle of the park, a 4-4-2 is unlikely to be a winning strategy against this Arsenal side.

Tactical Analysis: Manchester United 2-0 Crystal Palace

David Moyes picked up his first ever win at Old Trafford as Manchester United beat 10 man Crystal Palace 2-0. Kagisho Dikgacoi was sent off for Palace after being forced into a last ditch tackle on Ashley Young in first half stoppage time following a calamitous giveaway in front of the Palace penalty area by Mile Jedinak. The tackle resulted in a penalty though replays suggested the contact happened outside the box. Up to that point Palace had effectively frustrated United- Robin Van Persie's chest and volley off the woodwork from a great ball over the top by Rooney in the 39th minute was United's only gilt-edged opportunity of the half. Reduced to 10 men however, Palace couldn't get players high enough up the pitch to mount any sort of threat on David De Gea and it was job done for United by halftime.

Moyes made several personnel changes to the side that lost 1-0 two weekends ago at Anfield, though they used the normal 4-4-1-1 we've seen under Moyes. Fabio replaced Phil Jones at right back- his first appearance for United in over a year after spending last season on loan at QPR. Anderson replaced Tom Cleverley alongside Michael Carrick in the middle of midfield. Antonio Valencia was given the nod over Ryan Giggs on the right side of midfield and Wayne Rooney returned from a head gash injury to replace Danny Welbeck in the hole behind Van Persie.

Ian Holloway, who was watching from the bleachers while serving the second game of his two match ban, made one change to his Palace side that beat Sunderland 3-1 two weekends ago. Adrian Marriapa replaced Joel Ward at right back. Holloway also switched formations from a 4-4-1-1 to a 4-5-1/4-3-3. Jedinak sat just in front of the back four as the deepest of a center midfield three with Dikgacoi to his right and Jose Campana to his left. Dwight Gayle played wide on the left rather than behind Chamakh where he'd been used against Sunderland.

Starting XIs: Manchester United vs. Crystal Palace, 9/14/13

Prior to the sending off, the key tactical feature was Palace's defensive shape. The front three of Chamakh, Gayle and Puncheon would put pressure on United's back four higher up the field while Campana, Jedinak and Dikgacoi sat deeper in the middle as a compact midfield bank of three and would shift to whatever side of the field the ball was on. The two screen shots below are taken 6 seconds apart and show Palace's defensive rotation from the midfield and front 3.

Forward and midfield banks of three for Palace

The shape meant Palace were quite narrow defensively and left United's weak side wide midfielder in plenty of space to receive long crossfield passes. Ashley Young in particular found himself in acres of space on the left flank. Collecting the ball on the weak side allowed Young to take on Adrian Mariappa 1 v. 1 down the left side. When Young took the ball inside it allowed space for Evra to overlap. In the 19th minute Carrick hit a crossfield ball to Young wide on the left. He was able to beat Mariappa into the box but was then booked for a dive when there appeared to be minimal contact from Gabiddon's challenge. Although nothing came of it, the move showed Palace were most vulnerable when United were able to quickly switch the point of attack. The image below shows the moment just as Carrick is preparing to hit the diagonal ball to Young. Mariappa is tucked inside helping his center backs with the movement of Rooney and Van Persie. Puncheon is higher up the pitch in a narrow position to give Palace an extra body in the middle of midfield. For a player with Carrick's vision and passing ability it's an easy diagonal ball into Young.

Carrick switches point of attack to Young.

However, United were disappointing down the left and should have done more from that flank to trouble Palace. Young lacked the directness to run past the isolated Mariappa and get to the byline and too often his delivery from wide areas was poor. He managed just 2 successful take ons from 6 attempts down the left and none of his 8 crosses were successful. Although generally a right winger, this may have been an interesting game to see Wilfried Zaha play on the left as his ability to take on defenders could have been useful in getting passed Mariappa thereby forcing Gabiddon to step to ball and leave space in the box for runs from Rooney and Van Persie.

Disappointingly for the neutral observer, the direction of the game hinged on a lack of concentration from Jedinak (who had otherwise played quite well in the first half). His square pass to no one 25 yards from his own goal sent Young through on goal. Dikgacoi didn't have much of a choice but to lunge from behind and when he caught Young referee John Moss didn't had no option but to brandish the red. Van Persie dispatched the penalty and from there it was game over.

Down to 10, Palace played a 4-4-1, defending in two deep banks of four. With the extra man, United were easily able to keep possession high up the pitch. When Palace did win the ball back, they were so deep their only option for an outlet pass forward was a long and hopeful one into Chamakh. United could simply press the Palace fullbacks, forcing them to hit the long balls early into Chamakh that were comfortably dealt with by Vidic and Ferdinand. 

United were comfortable in the second half if not altogether inspiring. They still don't seem to have the balance quite right in midfield and the wide play hasn't been good enough all season. Rooney's second half free kick was genuinely world class but it may be a slight concern for United that they couldn't be more ruthless against a newly promoted side down to ten men at Old Trafford.

Pochettino's 4-3-1-2 creates chances but leaves Southampton unable to defend width of pitch

Not a new analysis but I just got around to watching Norwich vs. Southampton from last weekend and wanted to get a quick post on here about some interesting tactical developments, particularly from Southampton.

Both teams lined up in 4-4-2 formations. New Southampton signing Dani Osvaldo was given the nod up top alongside Lambert. Adam Lallana started down the left flank while James Ward-Prowse occupied the right midfield spot.

For Norwich, Johan Elmander was given the start alongside Ricky Van Wolfwinkel at forward. Leroy Fer and Bradley Johnson played center midfield. Nathan Redmond was on the left flank, Ryan Snodgrass on the right.

With both teams in 4-4-2 formations the battle in the middle of midfield was an even 2 v. 2. Norwich enjoyed the better of the play in the opening moments by attacking the flanks. On the left side they circulated the ball wide to Nathan Redmond who used his pace to run at left back Calum Chambers and cut inside onto his stronger right foot. Redmond cut inside on Chambers in the opening ten minutes and sent a shot just wide. On the right side, Johan Elmander would drift wide alongside Ryan Snodgrass to create overloads for Southampton right back Danny Fox.

At the other end of the pitch, Southampton struggled to get in any sort of rhythm in the attacking third. Osvaldo and Lambert didn't appear comfortable as playing part of a front two. Both players are strong holding up play but neither really has the pace to make penetrating runs in behind the defense. As a result, both seemed to make similar runs checking back to the ball in the early stages and Southampton lacked a penetrative threat.

With his side struggling to get going offensively, Saints boss Mauricio Pochettino made an extremely brave attacking switch in his side's shape. Adam Lallana moved from the left wing into the middle just behind Osvaldo and Lambert in a #10 role. Ward-Prowse tucked into a center midfield position to form a midfield three with Wanyama and Schneiderlin. Wanyama sat in front of the back four with Scheiderlin more advanced to his left, Ward-Prowse advanced to his right. The shape was therefore a narrow 4-3-1-2 as shown in the diagram below.

Fox and Chambers bombed forward to provide width in possession, effectively playing more as wingbacks in a 3-5-2 than fullbacks. It was an incredibly attacking shape, particularly given Southampton were the away side.

The change had an immediate impact offensively for Pochettino. Norwich were defending in two banks of four. They were happy to allow Wanyama to get on the ball in deep areas because he's not a skilled enough passer to cause problems playing penetrative forward passes. Johnson and Fer therefore picked up Ward-Prowse and Schneiderlin. Because Southampton were playing two up top, both Norwich center backs had to pick up a forward. This left Lallana with space in between the two lines of four to collect the ball and drive forward. Within a minute of making the switch, Lallana picked up the ball between the lines towards the right side of the pitch, cut in and took a shot 20 yards from goal. The shot struck Bradley Johnson's outstretched hand inside the area but Howard Webb failed to give what looked to be a clear penalty.

The additional man in midfield Pochettino's change created allowed Southampton to enjoy more possession and stretch Norwich in their defensive third.

However, defensively the change left the Saints vulnerable in wide areas. Their shape was 4-3-3 when Norwich were in possession. Lallana, Lambert and Osvaldo pressed the back four while Ward-Prowse, Schneiderlin and Wanayama formed a narrow midfield bank of three in behind them. With only three defending in midfield, Southampton couldn't cover the width of the pitch and Norwich were able to find their fullbacks and wide midfielders in space.

The photos and video below show where Southampton were vulnerable defensively. In the top image you can see their forward three and midfield three. Here, if Southampton are going to press Pablo Osvaldo needs to be closing down the easy pass for Fer into Bassong. He fails to do so and as a result their press is easily split.

Fer plays a simple ball back to Bassong. Osvaldo then elects to apply pressure to Bassong leaving an easy passing line for the center back to find the feet of Bradley Johnson. Bassong's simple ball into Johnson below has taken Lambert, Lallana and Osvaldo all out of the play. Johnson is able to receive the pass turn and play another easy ball forward into the feet of Fer, now leaving Schneiderlin out of position to defend Southampton's right wing.

Snodgrass tucks inside unmarked where he's spotted by Fer. With four easy passes Norwich have beaten Southampton's forward and midfield lines and are able to run at the back four with numbers (the video starts with Bassong's pass into Johnson). Snodgrass and Whittaker overload Fox 2 v. 1 down the right and Snodgrass is able to get a cross into the back post. Norwich should have earned a penalty from the move- Van Wolfswinkel's header at the back post was handled- but the move shows how difficult it was for Ward-Prowse, Wanayama and Schneiderlin to defend the width of the pitch.

The image below shows just how much of the pitch Southampton were forced to leave unoccupied by playing with a midfield line of three. Here Ward-Prowse is forced wide to pick up Redmond so that his right back Chambers can pick up the overlapping Norwich left back Javier Garrido. Wanyama slides in front of Elmander to block Redmond's passing lane there. Schneiderlin is trying to catch up with the play after having just gotten forward to provide an extra body in the attack. The entire center of pitch is free for either Norwich center midfielder to run into the space. In this move Johnson and Fer failed to do so but the space was there all afternoon when the ball shuffled into wide areas.

In the end, Norwich's goal would come at least partially as a result of Southampton's inability to defend the width of midfield. Fer was able to collect the ball on the right flank and play an easy crossfield ball into Redmond on the left wing. Redmond of course still had plenty to do after receiving the ball on the wing. His driving run inside and finish were sensational but had Southampton been defending with a midfield bank of four rather than three, Fer may well have been unable to get the ball into him in the first place (Fer's crossfield ball is at 25 seconds in the video below).

Spurs win but 4-3-3 shape leaves Soldado isolated

For the second consecutive weekend Tottenham have emerged 1-0 winners thanks to a Roberto Soldado penalty. The penalty decision looked fortuitous- Andros Townsend appeared to dive rather than being clipped by Swansea's Jonjo Shelvey. However, Shelvey was fortunate not to have conceded a penalty earlier when he clipped Townsend near the edge of the penalty area. Replays showed Townsend was in the box when he'd been fouled but referee Neil Swarbrick gave a free kick just outside the area. Overall Spurs were much the better side and just about deserved the three points.

One concern for Andre Villas Boas however will be his side's inability to get the ball to their record signing Soldado. The Spanish striker received only 13 passes in the entire match, none of which were inside the box. His only shot attempt on the afternoon was the penalty he tucked home.

Soldado is excellent at holding onto the ball and bringing his midfielders into the game, however he is not the type of striker that is going to receive the ball 25 yards from goal, turn and run at center backs to create goals. Rather he's a lethal finisher in the box. Of his 24 goals last season for Valencia all were scored inside the penalty box. Seventeen were one touch goals and and five were penalties. In other words, 89% of his goals that were scored in the run of play were one touch goals in the box (you can see all his goals from last season in the video below). A potent penalty box striker obviously needs to be receiving the ball around the goal which is why the 0 passes received in the penalty area will be a concern for Villas Boas.

A big reason Soldado didn't get touches in the penalty area today is that Villas Boas played a 4-3-3 as opposed to the 4-2-3-1 he used in the opener at Crystal Palace when Soldado received 32 passes, 6 of which were in the box and had 4 shots. You can see a comparison of the passes Soldado received today's Swansea game versus last weekend's Crystal Palace game below.

The 4-2-3-1 meant Soldado had Gylfi Sigurdsson playing just off of him in the attacking midfield role. The presence of the central attacking midfielder in a 4-2-3-1 does two things for the striker- he provides a link between the deeper lying midfielders and the striker so that the striker isn't isolated alone up top and he also gives the central defenders an extra man to worry about so they can't simply double team the striker.

Spurs 4-2-3-1 shape versus Crystal Palace

A 4-3-3 formation lacks that center attacking midfielder and instead uses one holding midfielder that sits deep just in front of the back four and two box-to-box shuttlers in front of him on either side. Today, Capoue played the holding midfield role with Paulinho and Dembele as the shuttlers. There was no attacking midfielder in the hole playing just off Soldado so Swansea's center backs were able concentrate solely on Soldado without worrying about being dragged out of position by the runs of an attacking midfielder. Spurs midfield three was physically much stronger and more powerful than Swansea's so they bossed the game in the center of midfield. However the absence of a #10 meant they struggled to find someone to link play with Soldado further up the pitch and he cut an isolated figure up top. Instead they looked to get the ball wide to the right and advance forward with Townsed and the overlapping Kyle Walker. Townsend was by far Spurs most dangerous player but Villas Boas would almost certainly prefer more chances falling to his £26 million pound #9 than from Townsend cutting in from the right. 

Liverpool grind out 1-0 win at Villa Park

After dominating the early proceedings at Villa Park, Liverpool managed to hang on to a 1-0 win over Aston Villa despite finding themselves under heavy pressure from the home side throughout the second half. Villa out-shot Liverpool 17 to 5 in the match and 11 to 1 in the second half yet were denied an equalizer thanks to some resolute defending from Liverpool and fine goalkeeping from Simon Mignolet. The Belgian keeper twice produced world class saves to deny his countryman Christian Benteke his fourth goal of the young season. Although Liverpool produced little going forward after the break it was the type of game they'd have failed to take maximum points from last season so you'd expect Brendan Rodgers to be pleased with his side's ability to grind out a result.

Liverpool bossed possession and controlled the territory in the opening half hour. They pressed high up the pitch when they lost possession and forced Villa to launch hopeful balls towards Benteke. These long balls rarely fell to their intended target and when they did the striker was too isolated to do anything with them. After 30 minutes Liverpool had outpassed Villa 269 to 97 and 59 to 14 in the attacking third. You can see below Villa completed just 50% of their passes into the final third in the opening half hour. The bulk of the failed attempts were hopeful longballs forced by Liverpool's pressing.

However, for all their attractive possession, they failed to create many genuine scoring opportunities. A critique against Brendan Rodgers is that his teams offer plenty of attractive passing and attacking movement without finding that penetrating ball to open up defenses. In his final season at Swansea, Rodgers' team finished with the third highest average possession total in the league (behind Arsenal and Manchester City) yet only five teams scored fewer goals in the campaign. Daniel Sturridge produced a fantastic solo effort in the 21st minute but it ended up being Liverpool's only shot on target in the game. Rodgers will be desperate to convert that ball domination into more scoring opportunities. Luis Suarez has that ability to create opportunities on his own out of nothing and if he stays at Anfield he'll certainly help the cause after serving out his suspension.

After taking the lead Liverpool stopped pressing and began to defend deeper in banks of four. This allowed Villa more time on the ball in their own defensive half. They were able to knock some passes around which seemed to help them grow in confidence and they finally threatened the Liverpool goal late in the half with Benteke turning in the books and producing a curling effort to Mignolet's back post. The Belgian keeper did excellent to stretch to his left and parry the ball away for a corner.

There was a bit of a role reversal in the second half. Liverpool continued to sit deeper in banks of four and looked to soak up pressure. Villa became a bit more direct knocking long balls directly into Benteke and getting into the channels for crosses. After struggling to advance the ball into Liverpool's defensive half in the opening 45 minutes, Villa managed 50 passes in the final third to Liverpool's 28 in the second half. They took 11 shots to Liverpool's 1. However, Liverpool deserve credit for dealing with the pressure defensively. In Benteke, Agbonlahor, Weimann, and Delph Villa have genuine attacking quality. Both Chelsea and Arsenal were unable to keep them off the board at home. For Liverpool to do so at Villa Park is a fine achievement and says a lot about the Agger-Toure center back partnership thus far.

Despite struggling to get a foothold in the second half, Liverpool have proven they can win difficult games away from home. In Villa they've beaten a team that beat Arsenal at the Emirates and deserved a point against Chelsea at Stamford Bridge. The win today means they have 6 points as of August 24. It took them until October 20 to get up over the 5 point total last season. That in itself is reason for cautious optimism at Liverpool.

Tactical Analysis: Arsenal pick apart disjointed Fulham defense

Arsenal ran out comfortable 3-1 winners over Fulham at Craven Cottage to secure the Gunners' first win of the season and further ease some of the pressure that had mounted after their opening day defeat to Aston Villa. First half goals from Olivier Giroud and Lukas Podolski put Arsenal firmly in control. Podolski added his second in the 68th to make it 3-0 and put the contest beyond doubt. Darren Bent got a consolation goal for the home side in his first appearance with the Cottagers.

With Laurent Koscielny suspended Bacary Sagna slid in to center back and Carl Jenkinson started at right back. Arsene Wenger opted to rest Jack Wilshere and went with a midfield three of Aaron Ramsey, Santi Cazorla and Tomas Rosicky. Ramsey sat in front of the center backs when Arsenal were in possession with Cazorla to his left and Rosicky to his right in more advanced positions. The formation was therefore more 4-3-3 than Arsenal's usual 4-2-3-1. Podolski played on the left of the front three with Walcott on the right.

Martin Jol made three changes to the side that beat Sunderland in the opening week. New signing Scott Parker replaced Derek Boateng in midfield. David Stockdale came in at goalkeeper in place of the injured Martin Stekelenburg and John Arne Riise was given the start at left back with Kieran Richardson also sidelined with an injury. Fulham's shape was their usual 4-4-1-1 with Patjim Kasami playing off Dimitar Berbatov up top.

The key for Arsenal in the first half was their domination in the center of the park. The 4-3-3 vs. 4-4-1 match up meant Arsenal had a man advantage in the middle of the park that led to Parker and Steve Sidwell simply being overrun in the middle. Fulham defended in two banks of four with Kasami and Berbatov higher up the pitch. Podolski tucked inside from the left giving Arsenal a further advantage in the middle. Both of Arsenal's first half goals came as a result of Parker and Sidwell having too much distance between the two of them and an overall lack of compactness in Fulham's defensive shape. This created loads of space for Arsenal's midfielders to move into.

The image below shows the buildup to Arsenal's opener. Sidwell pressures Cazorla in possession, Parker positions himself centrally just in front of the back four. Ramsey slides into the space to the left of Parker and in front of Riise, receives the pass in space and has plenty of time to turn and shoot before he's closed down. His shot is a weak one but falls to Giroud to tuck home. The issue here for Fulham is the amount of space Ramsey has to collect possession. Ideally in a 4-4-1-1 you'd want either Kasami or Berbatov working back to pressure Cazorla on the ball so that Sidwell can position himself side-by-side with Parker in front of the back four thereby preventing Arsenal's midfielders from easily collecting possession by sliding either side of Parker. There was a real disconnect defensively between Fulham's two center midfielders and two advanced attackers which forced Parker and Sidwell into chasing the ball in midfield while leaving at least one Arsenal midfielder unmarked.

Arsenal's second goal again came from poor defensive shape from Fulham. In the top image below you can see the large distances between Fulham players, leaving huge gaps for Arsenal to play in to. Parker is pressuring Cazorla on the left while Sidwell sits in the middle close to Rosicky. There is some 20 yards of space between the two. Fulham are neither pressing nor organizing into a compact shape at midfield which leaves Arsenal with time on the ball and the space in advanced positions to pick out forward passes. Here, Podolski simply tucks inside from the left and Mertesacker is easily able to play a pass into his feet. With the simplest of balls Arsenal have bisected the Fulham midfield. Podolski receives the pass, Sidwell slides over to close him down and that leaves Cazorla completely unmarked to burst forward through the middle. He's able to slide a ball through to Walcott whose shot can only be pushed by Stockdale into the feet of Podolski to slam home. It's Mertesacker's simple pass into Podolski that has Fulham completely out of position and scrambling to get pressure on the ball. If Fulham are going to press here they need the back four much higher up the pitch. If they aren't going to commit to the press everyone needs to drop off and Parker and Sidwell need to much closer together in the center of midfield.

Fulham neither pressing nor dropping in and getting compact. Too much space between Parker and Sidwell

Podolski easily able to tuck in and collect possession from Mertesacker. Fulham midfield bisected with one simple pass.

Arsenal's second half was professional. Whereas in the first half they defended with banks of four and looked to boss possession, in the second half they defended with a midfield bank of five, conceded some territory to Fulham and looked to hit them on the break. With Arsenal dropping deeper, Fulham had more of the ball in advanced areas than they did in the first half- they completed just 29 passes in the attacking third in the first half compared to 56 in the second half- but Arsenal's compact midfield five meant they were unable to find any decisive penetrating passes to trouble the defense. The Gunners ultimately did hit the home side on the break in the 68th to seal the win.

Overall Arsenal will be pleased with their performance. They dominated meaningful possession in the first half and were able to overrun Fulham in the middle of midfield. Comfortably in control by the end of the first half, they wisely didn't stretch themselves going forward in the second. Given their lack of true holding midfielder in the side, it would have been an unnecessary risk to continue pressing forward as they did in the first half and leave themselves exposed at the back.

Fulham made the game far too easy for Arsenal. They owe much of the loss to some abject defensive shape. They were far too disjointed and Jol will need to make sure Parker and Sidwell stay more compact in future fixtures.

Tactical Analysis: Manchester City 4-0 Newcastle

Manchester City scored twice in each half to run out comfortable 4-0 winners over Newcastle in an impressive performance at the Etihad. David Silva and Sergio Aguero each found the net before Newcastle’s Steven Taylor was sent off just before halftime for a forearm swing into the back of Aguero. Yaya Toure added a sublime freekick early in the second half and substitute Samir Nasri closed out the scoring in the 75^th.

There were three major tactical features of the game: David Silva’s ability to create overloads and find gaps coming inside from the left, the refreshing width provided by Jesus Navas on the right flank, and the partnership and clever movement of Aguero and Edin Dzeko.

Lineups:

Manuel Pelligrini set his side out in a similar 4-2-2-2 formation to the one typically used by Roberto Mancini, the man he replaced. Clichy, Lescott, Kompany and Zabaleta made up the back four. Toure and new signing Fernandinho made up the center midfield, occupying the space in front of the back four. David Silva frequently tucked inside from a starting position on the left, as he did under Mancini, while Jesus Navas stayed wide on the right to provide width. Aguero and Dzeko were given starts up top over newcomers Stevan Jovetic and Alvaro Negredo.

Newcastle did not include French midfielder Johan Cabaye in the squad after Arsenal had a £10 million bid rejected for him earlier in the day. They lined up in something of a hybrid 4-3-3/4-4-2. The midfield three was made up of Jonas Gutierrez, Cheick Tiote and Moussa Sissoko. Hatem Ben Arfa started on the right of a front three. Yoan Gouffran was on the left with Papiss Cisse as the main striker. In possession Ben Arfa would frequently drop deep on the right flank while Gutierrez would drift wider to the left. Gouffran would tuck inside close to Cisse making the shape more of a 4-4-2. Defensively they formed two banks of four with Ben Arfa dropping in alongside the midfield three and Cisse and Gouffran staying higher up the pitch. 

Click for larger image

David Silva’s Movement:

David Silva’s movement is always a handful for opposing defenses. He’s tremendous at reading the runs of his fellow attackers, finding space between the seams and creating overloads for opposition defenders. For instance, when Aguero drops into midfield and is picked up by the opposition holding midfielder, Silva will drift infield alongside Aguero to create a 1 v. 2 situation for the holding midfielder to defend (Figure 1). When Aguero drifts wide and is picked up by the opposing left back, Silva will tuck just inside and create 1 v. 2 situations for the left back (figure 2). 

Figure 1

Figure 2

He’ll also drift into the space between the opposition right-sided center midfielder and right midfielder/forward, where he can collect passes from the two deeper lying midfielders and have the space to run at the defense. He was incredibly dangerous in this space last night, collecting possession from Fernandinho in the gap between Sissoko and Ben Arfa. City’s opener came from this type of movement. The image below shows Silva tucking inside of Ben Arfa where he’s able to receive a pass from Fernandinho and has the space to turn and dribble at the defense. He releases a pass to Dzeko on the left side of the box whose deflected pass across the face of goal falls for Silva to head home.  Identical movement from Silva in the 29^th allowed him to release Dzeko through on goal again but the Bosnian striker was unable to finish. 

Navas provides width:

For much of last season Maninci employed Samir Nasri on the right. Like Silva, Nasri enjoys tucking infield from wide areas. When the two played together City could often therefore become a bit narrow. In Jesus Navas, Pelligrini has a true right-sided winger capable of providing width and stretching the defense laterally. This gives City a bit more balance going forward- they can through the middle with Silva tucking inside or down the wing with Navas hugging the touchline. The graphics below compare where Silva and Navas received passes yesterday. Nearly every pass Navas received was down the right channel whereas Silva moved freely around the pitch to create overloads. Navas had a shaky start but was excellent in the second half, combining well with Zabaleta and whipping in some dangerous crosses.

Click for larger image

Movement of Aguero and Dzeko:

The final major defining feature of this game was the partnership between Aguero and Dzeko. When playing with two forwards it is obviously important both understand the off-ball movement of one another. One of the major strengths of a two forward system is that against a team playing four at the back, both opposition center backs have to pick up a forward so neither is left free to provide cover.

One way teams using two forwards like to take advantage of the lack of a spare center back for the opposition is to put both forwards on the shoulder of each of the center backs. One forward then checks into midfield, drawing one of the center backs with him. The other forward will then make a diagonal run into the space that becomes available. The figure below shows an example. Here, Dzeko checks into midfield for the ball, forcing Coloccini to step out of line with the rest of the back four to close him down. This opens up space in behind for Aguero to make a diagonal run into. 

In fact, the example illustrates the forward movement City used to score their second goal. Dzeko checked into midfield for a pass from Kompany, forcing Coloccini to follow him. Rather than step forward to force Aguero into an offside position, Taylor follows his diagonal run in behind but doesn’t have the pace to keep. Dzeko provides a clever flick and Aguero is one on one with Krul to tuck it home. Below you can see a screenshot of the buildup. Coloccini steps out to Dzeko just as Aguero begins his diagonal run in behind.

Although Dzeko was guilty several times of wasting his own goal scoring chances, his movement with Aguero was clever and he deserves credit for setting up the first two goals and generally stretching Taylor and Coloccini around the field in the first half. 

Conclusion:

Pellegrini will be pleased with what was a dominant performance in all facets. I didn't discuss it in any detail above but Fernandinho and Toure formed a powerful and formidable midfield pairing capable of both breaking up attacks from the opposition and springing into the attacking third to offer extra options. Fernandinho completed the second most passes in the attacking third of any player behind Silva. 

Tacticially it wasn't an especially different look from Pellegrini although the inclusion of Navas added width City frequently lacked last season. 

It's difficult to judge Alan Pardew's side after such a difficult opening fixture in which they played half of it with ten men. They have plenty of power in midfield but were desperately missing the technical ability of Cabaye and could struggle to break teams down if he ends up departing for Arsenal. Ben Arfa looked to be the only player capable of providing any creativity in a lineup full of strength and power. 

USA 1-0 Costa Rica: CR 5 man defense frustrates US but provides little going forward

A well-executed counter-attacking goal from a Costa Rica corner allowed the USA to run out group C winners in the Gold Cup in what was a cautiously played and uneventful game. 

Tactically, the game was defined by the Central American side’s rather unusual use of a flat back 5 playing an aggressively high line and thereby making the middle of the field very compact for the US. From a defensive standpoint the strategy worked well but fielding a five man defense was a strange decision from Costa Rica manager Jorge Luis Pinto. His team had already clinched a top two berth in the group no matter how severe a loss they may have suffered and only a win would have won them the group. I expected his strategy to therefore be a bit more adventurous. His side may have frustrated the US defensively but they created only one meaningful chance of their own.

Costa Rica defends 5-4-1

Costa Rica played a flat five man defense behind a midfield bank of four with Jairo Arrieta as the lone striker up top. When the US had possession in their own defensive third, the Costa Rica midfield four would drop off towards the halfway line and the back five would step forward towards the bottom of the center circle. As a result their defense was quite compact and the US had very little space between the lines to collect the ball and run at the defense. As the US advanced the ball towards the center circle, Costa Rica put high pressure on the ball- particularly on holding midfielders Stu Holden and Mix Diskerud and fullbacks Michael Parkhurst and DeMarcus Beasley- making it difficult for them to find the time to pick out forward passes.  The image below shows just how compact the Costa Rican defense was and how little space the US had in the middle of the park. 

Playing a high line worked particularly well for Costa Rica given Jurgen Klinsmann’s decision to start Chris Wondolowski at center forward. Wondolowski’s strengths are as a poacher inside the penalty area. He’s not a gifted passer capable of dropping off the defense and providing neat link up play in tight spaces with midfielders nor does he have the pace to be dangerous on balls played over the top in behind a high back line.  By playing such a high line, Costa Rica was taking him 30 yards away from the penalty area where he is most dangerous.  In the image above you can see him 40-45 yards from goal surrounded by two defenders. In the image below, taken in the first minute, he’s in an offside position taken completely out of play by the high, flat line. He was ultimately subbed off in the 77^th minute, goalless for the first time in three games and looking a visibly frustrated figure.

With Costa Rica’s back line positioning itself 40 yards from goal, the space for the US was in behind the back line rather than in midfield. Klinsmann could possibly have used a pacier striker to stay on the shoulder of the center backs but to do so requires a deeper lying player that can accurately hit those balls over the top of the defense (see Andrea Pirlo and Mario Balotelli operate for Italy against an opponent with a high line). For all of their strengths circulating possession, I’m not sure Diskerud and Holden have the ability to consistently hit those diagonal long balls accurately.

Costa Rica Attack

With their emphasis on a high defensive line and midfield pressing, Costa’s Rica’s attacking strategy was to win the ball in midfield and break forward quickly before the US had time to recover defensively. At times in the first half the strategy looked dangerous. The clip below shows what Los Ticos were looking to do- they press well to win the ball at the halfway line then play two quick vertical passes looking to get behind the US defense. However, the move lacked a quality final ball and highlights Costa Rica’s struggles in the final third all game. US center backs Clarence Goodson and Michael Orozco deserve credit as well as I thought their positioning was decent throughout. 

In the second half Costa Rica tired and their pressing grew less intense. They dropped deeper defensively, won fewer balls in midfield and allowed the US to control possession. As a result, Arrieta was left isolated up top. Costa Rica created little and the US defense looked comfortable. Los Ticos’ only real chance on goal in the second half was a header off of a corner kick that rattled the crossbar (initially it looked like Sean Johnson had made a wonderful save but after watching the replay I think it went straight off the bar). From that corner the US was able to find the space to counter and get the winner (a game of inches). Second half substitute Joe Corona played an excellent outlet pass down the right flank to Donovan who played an even better one-touch crossfield through ball for Brek Shea (also a second half sub) to tuck home.

Conclusion

In the end it was a professional, if not overwhelmingly impressive performance from the US. Costa Rica’s five man high back line frustrated Klinsmann’s side in midfield but also left Arrieta isolated up front as the game wore on and didn’t provide them with the necessary firepower going forward to get the win they needed to clinch first place in the group.

Tactical Analysis: Bayern Munich 4-0 Barcelona

Bayern Munich stunned Barcelona with a memorable 4-0 win in a dominant performance at the Allianz Arena that leaves the Bavarian side with one foot in the Champions League final. That Barca ended the game with as many attempts as Bayern had goals is an indicator of just how much Jupp Heynckes' side controlled proceedings.

Bayern (4-2-3-1): Lahm, Boateng, Dante, Alaba

                             Javi Martinez, Schweinsteiger

                                  Robben, Muller, Ribery

                                               Gomez

Barcelona (4-3-3): Dani Alves, Bartra, Pique, Alba

                                               Busquets

                                            Xavi, Iniesta

                                     Pedro, Messi, Sanchez

Prior to the match, Barcelona's official website had posted that the team had reached 300 consecutive games in which they had over 50% possession. Much had been made about whether Bayern, second in Europe behind Barca in terms of possession per game, would try to compete in midfield, press high up the field and possess the ball.

As it turned out, they took a more reactive approach, allowing Barca to have possession in their own half, then pressing the ball relentlessly when it crossed the midfield line. In his analysis for ESPN following the game, Robbie Mustoe commented on how compact Bayern were from front to back, preventing the likes of Messi and Iniesta from finding the pockets of space between the seams where they operate so effectively. He was spot on- this was the key tactical feature of the game.

Bayern defended in two banks of four with Tomas Muller and Mario Gomez playing higher up the field and applying pressure to Barca's center backs and deepest midfielder Sergio Busquets. Any time Xavi Hernandez or Andres Iniesta would drop in front of Bayern's midfield four to collect the ball, one Bayern midfielder would immediately step out and apply intense pressure on the ball. Typically Bastian Schweinsteiger performed this role while Javi Martinez stayed deeper to check runs from Messi and Iniesta into the gaps. The pressure meant Xavi and Iniesta were unable to turn and enjoy the time on the ball to pick out a penetrating pass forward.

In order to keep the space Barca had to operate in compact, the Bayern defense played a high line. Often the space between the back four and midfield four was no more than 10 yards. Messi is at his most dangerous when he's able to collect the ball in the space between the opposition center backs and center midfielders and turn and dribble. However, Bayern's high line meant these spaces weren't available for him. When he dropped off Boateng and Dante and drifted into midfield, generally Javi Martinez was there to deny the entry pass into his feet. The high line likely explains Bayern's decision to start Jerome Boateng alongside Dante at center back rather than Daniel Van Buyten. Boateng is quicker and therefore more able to recover defensively when balls are played in behind the back four.

Bayern's back four was never really made to sweat their high line because of Barca's formation. With Messi operating as a false 9 and drifting back into midfield, the Catalans never really offered a threat behind Bayern's back four. Often without a direct opponent to defend, Dante and Boateng were able to sit in, see Barca's attacks developing in front of them and react accordingly by stepping into passing lanes. The inclusion of David Villa at center forward would have given Barca a vertical threat and forced the Bayern center backs into more difficult decisions regarding their positioning. Messi could have then played a very narrow position on the right. Barca used that formation against in their second leg demolition of AC Milan and it caused Milan center back Philippe Mexes all sorts of troubles. He was continually forced into deciding whether to leave Villa and step to Messi or allow Messi to get on the ball and dribble.

In attack, Bayern looked to counter quickly into the channels when they retained possession. With Alba and Dani Alves pushing forward to provide width in attack for Barcelona, there was space in behind them on the wings for Bayern to play quick outlet passes into. Muller did an excellent job drifting into these wide areas from his center attacking midfield position to spring counters. Ribery and Robben would also look to dart in behind the Barca fullbacks on the break. Bayern also looked to exploit their aerial superiority by getting crosses into the back post from set pieces and open play. Their first two goals both came from winning an initial ball at the back post and knocking it back across the middle for easy finishes.

Jupp Heynckes is deserving of a great deal of credit for this dominant performance. He showed his tactical flexibility, conceding possession to Barca and adopting a counterattacking style Bayern have rarely played this season. In so doing he has all but assured his side will be playing in their second consecutive Champions League final.

Tactical Analysis: Chelsea 3-0 Fulham

Chelsea cruised to a comfortable 3-0 over a tame Fulham side at Craven Cottage to overtake Arsenal for third place. David Luiz opened the scoring with a blistering effort from 40 yards out in the 30th minute before John Terry scored with his head either side of halftime. It was an efficient performance from the away side, if not an especially mesmerizing one.

Chelsea lined up with Ivanovic, Luiz, Terry and Bertrand across the back four in the Blues' 4-2-3-1. Lampard and Ramires occupied the holding roles while Mata played in his normal central attacking midfield position. Hazard and Moses played on the flanks.

Fulham played a 4-4-1. Reither, Senderos, Hangeland and Riise made up the back four. Enoh and Karagounis played in the middle of midfield with Bryan Ruiz on the right wing and Emanuelson on the left. Berbatov played in the hole off of center forward Petric.

The Blues struggled to carve out any meaningful possession in the attacking third in the opening half hour. Fulham defended in two deep banks of four with Berbatov just in front of the midfield four applying pressure to either Ramires or Lampard, depending on who dropped deepest. Fulham's deep, compact shape made it difficult for the likes of Mata, Hazard and Torres to find space between the seams. As a result Chelsea completed plenty of passes in the final third in the first 30 minutes (more than half the passes they completed in the final third occurred in the opening half hour) but they were balls played horizontally in front of the Fulham defense that weren't especially dangerous.

With Chelsea struggling to find gaps in the Cottagers' defense, the home side would have been happy to take their chances allowing Luiz to shoot speculatively from 40 yards out. However, they were made to pay for their deep defending. With Berbatov picking up Chelsea's deepest midfielder, Petric was left to defend Terry and Luiz 1 v. 2. This allowed the Brazilian to advance into Chelsea's attacking half with time and space on the ball. On 30 minutes he took advantage, collecting a pass from Eden Hazard before unleashing an absolute pile driver into the top corner. Had Fulham defended higher up the pitch he wouldn't have been in a position to take the shot. Of course, defending higher may have also led to the more frightening situations of Chelsea finding space between the lines or in behind the back four.

Chelsea doubled their lead 13 minutes later through John Terry. The Blues' captain had stayed up after Fulham failed to fully clear the danger from a Chelsea corner. The ball ultimately came to Mata on the left sideline and the Spaniard whipped in a perfect cross for Terry to nod home at the back post. The defending from Fulham was poor. Terry was able to slip between Reither and Senderos at the back post. Senderos perhaps could have done more to win the header but he wasn't helped by his right back who should have done better to track the run. Chelsea were in a comfortable 2-0 position without ever really getting out of first gear in the opening half.

Offensively for Fulham, Berbatov looked for space in between the Chelsea lines but for the most part Lampard and Ramires did a good job tracking his movement and denying passes into his feet. As a result he began to drop into deeper areas to get on the ball and the gap between Petric and the rest of the Fulham squad became bigger.

Commentator Ian Wright criticized Petric throughout the match for not making the proper runs back towards the ball but I disagreed. Had Petric continually checked back into midfield for the ball Fulham would have lacked any type of threat behind the Chelsea back four. By staying on the shoulders of Chelsea's center backs, Petric was looking to stretch the opposition and create space in the gaps for Berbatov. Had he continually checked back into midfield for the ball he would have been moving into the same spaces Berbatov was trying to occupy and Fulham would have lacked any threat of a ball played behind the Chelsea defense. The Blues tend to be comfortable defending when they're able to keep everything in front of them. They have much more trouble with balls played in behind.

Fulham's problem going forward seemed to be an inability to get enough players around the ball in the attacking third to create dangerous passing sequences. They were disjointed in the final third and lacked the movement and final ball to break down Chelsea.

In the end it wasn't a particularly exciting match. Fulham never looked like mounting a comeback and with the game secured Chelsea were happy to cruise away with three valuable points

Tactical Analysis (Brief): Arsenal 0-0 Everton

 Arsenal and Everton drew 0-0 at the Emirates this evening, a result that likely wouldn't satisfy either side as they chase a top four finish.

Although the game was lively and entertaining, it wasn't particularly interesting from a tactical perspective. Both sides have consistent systems they rarely stray away from and that was the case today.

Everton played their usual 4-4-1-1 formation. Leon Osman missed out for the first time in the league this season with an injury. He was replaced in the lineup by Ross Barkley who played in the advanced midfield role normally occupied by Marouane Fellani. Fellaini dropped in alongside Darron Gibson in a deeper midfield role- a spot he has stated he is most comfortable playing.

Arsenal made two changes to the side that beat Norwich 3-1 at the weekend. Theo Walcott replaced Gervinho on the right flank and Vermaelen was dropped for Per Mertesacker. Jack Wilshere played in his usual position off the center forward while Santi Cazorla was used on the left.

The opening half was a chippy one and neither side really developed any sort of offensive rhythm, evidenced by the fact we didn't see a shot on goal until Barkley's forced Wojech Szczesny into a save in the 39th minute.

Everton defended in two banks of four with Barkley and Anichebe staying higher up the pitch. Barkley looked to deny passes from Arsenal's center backs into Arteta, forcing Ramsey to also drop into deep areas to provide Koscielny and Mertesacker with a pass forward. When Ramsey received passes in front of the Everton midfield four, Fellaini would quickly step out and pressure him, forcing him into quick decisions.

Arsenal's attacking midfield three was quite fluid, as is often the case when Cazorla and Wilshere are in the same lineup. Both players often drifted to the right side of the field looking to create overloads for Leon Osman and Steven Peinaar. The graphic below of Arsenal's first half passes in the attacking third shows how focused their attack was down the right side in the first half. The graphic also shows Cazorla's attacking third passes in the first half. The number of those passes that occurred on the right side of the pitch is surprising for a player lining up as a left midfielder.

The game opened up a bit in the second half and Arsenal were the more dangerous of the two sides. The mostly ineffective Wilshere was replaced by Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain and Walcott was replaced by Lukas Podolski on 68 minutes. Cazorla moved into the middle with Podolski to his left and Oxlade-Chamberlain to his right. The Spaniard tends to be much more effective playing through the middle where he has fewer defensive responsibilities and can get on the ball more often between the seams. The personnel change and shift in positions nearly had an immediate impact. On 78 minutes Podolski recovered possession deep in Arsenal's defensive third and played a smart outlet ball to Cazorla who had drifted into a dangerous area behind the Everton midfielders to spring an Arsenal counter. Cazorla found Oxlade-Chamberlain breaking down the right edge of the penalty area unmarked. Oxlade-Chamberlain could have taken a shot himself but instead opted to slip the ball across the six for Giroud. The ball was played behind the French forward however and ended up in Tim Howard's grateful hands.

Although Fellaini unsurprisingly didn't have the same offensive impact we're use to seeing when he plays in the #10 role, he was excellent occupying a defensive midfield position and was arguably the game's best player. He was consistently perfectly positioned to slow down Arsenal counter attacks and did a fine job both tracking bursts forward from Ramsey and providing cover on the right side where Arsenal continually looked to attack. He had 6 successful tackles, more than any other player in the game, and 4 interceptions, the third most of any player. He also completed more passes than any Everton player with 51.

3 Keys to Barca comeback

Barca become the first team to overcome a 2-0 first leg away defeat in the Champions League knockout stages, advancing through to the quarterfinals with a 4-0 win over Milan at the Nou Camp.

A pair of first half goals from Lionel Messi evened the tie at 2-2 on aggregate before David Villa tucked home the winner in the 55th minute. Jordi Alba put the tie beyond doubt with a fourth in stoppage time. Here are three key factors that contributed to Barca's historic comeback.

1. David Villa replaces Fabregas in starting XI
Barcelona struggled to create meaningful scoring chances in the first leg defeat largely because they lacked a threat behind Milan's center back pairing of Philippe Mexes and Cristian Zapata. In that game, Messi was used in his normal roaming center forward position but mainly stayed just to the right of the center of the pitch in Mexes' zone. Fabregas was given a free role in the middle and mainly looked to find space in between the lines towards the left. Andres Iniesta was therefore used on the left wing.

There were two problems with this lineup. Iniesta likes to cut inside when he plays on the left. With Fabregas occupying a narrow left-sided position, the two often seemed to get in the way of one another when Iniesta cut in. The second problem also stemmed from the inclusion of Fabregas. He maintained a fairly deep position, never looking to make runs in behind the Milan center backs. As he always does when playing center forward, Messi continually looked to drop in the space between Milan's center backs and midfield to collect the ball between the lines. However, because Barca didn't have a player more advanced than Messi looking to make runs in behind, Mexes was able to stay tight on the back of Messi when he looked to drop between the lines to collect the ball, knowing Zapata was the spare man behind him and could provide cover for any runs that came from midfield. Messi was quiet and Barca only had one shot on target.


The decision to drop Fabregas and replace him with Villa last night meant a bit of lineup reshuffling and a change in tactics for Jordi Roura. Villa was employed at center forward. Messi played a very narrow right sided position, Iniesta switched from wide on the left to a central attacking midfield spot and Pedro switched from a wide right to a wide left position. Althought Villa was relatively quiet before providing the goal that would see Barca through, his inclusion as the most advanced attacker was vital in opening space for Messi to receive the ball between the lines. Villa offered a threat behind the Milan center backs and stayed on the shoulder of Mexes. Mexes could therefore no longer step forward between the lines to close down Messi. To do so would have meant leaving Villa free in the area or relying on Zapata to slide over to pick him up- which would have opened up acres of space on the right side of Milan's box. Messi sat just behind Montolivo on the left side of Milan's three man center midfield and in front of Mexes and had the space to collect the ball and run at defenders. His finishers were out of this world but Villa's inclusion had a lot to do with why he was so much more dangerous than at the San Siro.

2. Adriano replaces Pedro in the 84th
When David Villa tucked home Barca's third, Milan right back Ignazio Abate became much braver with his positioning as the Italian side were forced to chase a goal that would put them through. Between Villa's goal and the introduction of Adriano, Abate was time and again given the space to overlap down the right wing unmarked as Jordi Alba was occupied defending Kevin Prince Boateng in narrower areas. He sent in some decent low hit balls across the face of goal and one was nearly converted (by Boateng if I remember correctly). Barca were on the back foot, defending deeper and it looked for a time that Milan would get a number of chances in front of goal in the final minutes off of balls whipped in from Abate. However, Roura brought in Adriano to offer protection in front of Alba and track the forward runs of Abate. The Milan right back was unable to get in space on the wing after the change and didn't get a ball in the box for the remainder of the game.

3. Niang's miss
Who knows how the game would have played out had Niang put away the 1 v. 1 chance against Victor Valdes that struck the post but the psychological impact on both teams would have been massive had he leveled the score there. As it turned out Messi would even the tie at two just a minute later. Barca could smell blood and from there it seemed inevitable they'd finish the job.

Tactical Analysis: Real Madrid 2-1 Manchester United (3-2 ag)

Sir Alex Ferguson's controversial decisions to start Ryan Giggs and Nani at right and left midfield respectively and bench Wayne Rooney looked to be paying dividends as Manchester United went into the locker room level with Real Madrid at 0-0 and looking the more dangerous of the two sides.

Madrid had created little in the opening 45 minutes. Ronaldo was uncharacteristically quiet and United looked dangerous every time they broke forward on the counter.

Ferguson opted for a 4-4-2, employing Danny Welbeck alongside Robin Van Persie up top. It was expected Tom Cleverley would replace the injured Phil Jones and play on the right side of center midfield to provide Rafael with defensive help on Ronaldo. However, it was Carrick who was fielded more towards the right with Cleverley on the left side of central midfield. Rafael, Ferdinand, Vidic and Evra lined up across the back.

Jose Mourinho's side lined up just as they had in the first leg with the exception of Higuain in for Benzema at forward.

United defended fairly deep with two banks of four. Welbeck dropped in behind Van Persie and tracked Xabi Alonso, denying him from receiving passes from Verane and Sergio Ramos. United's defensive lines of four were compact but it was still surprising that Ozil, usually fantastic at finding pockets of space in between the seams, was having so much trouble receiving the ball in behind Cleverley and Carrick.

With Welbeck denying Xabi Alonso the opportunity to get on the ball and pick out forward passes from deep in midfield, Madrid's more advanced attackers dropped deeper and deeper to get on the ball. On separate occasions Ozil, Di Maria and Higuain dropped well behind United's midfield four to get on the ball. It was a testament to Ferguson's tactics and United's organization that those three gifted attackers were collecting the ball 45 yards from goal where they are obviously far less dangerous.

On the right side of the United defense, Giggs played deep and dropped in to help Rafael on Ronaldo whenever he could. Every time Rafael advanced forward when United were in possession, either Giggs or one of the center midfielders dropped in to fill the defensive hole in an effort to deny Ronaldo the space to counter.

Offensively, United looked to counter rapidly. Once they regained possession, Welbeck would sprint past Xabi Alonso and into the channels to spring counters. They looked to create overloads in wide areas and send crosses into the box.

Second Half
Although United's opener was largely due to an individual error from Varane, it highlighted their ability to make dangerous runs in behind the Madrid midfield and advance the ball forward at pace. Rafael broke forward down the right before finding Welbeck's late surging run into the box. Eventually the ball broke for Nani whose low cross was deflected by Ramos into his own net.

Nani's 56th minute red card turned the game on its head. United were forced to switch to a 4-4-1. Welbeck went wide left and Van Persie played alone up top. Recognizing he didn't need four at the back to deal only with Van Persie, Mourinho replaced right back Arbeloa with Luka Modric and switched to a 3-4-3. Madrid therefore had a 4 v. 2 advantage in the middle of midfield. Welbeck and Giggs tucked narrow to the inside to offer help in the central areas, conceding the left channel entirely to Coentrao.

Ferguson's men continued to defend in banks of four but, crucially, they no longer had Welbeck in the middle of the pitch to defend Madrid's deepest midfielder. Modric dropped deep alongside Xabi Alonso and both were given the time and space to pick out forward passes between gaps in the United midfield four. This allowed the likes of Kaka (who had replaced the injured Di Maria in the first half), Ozil, Ronaldo and Higuain to stay in more advanced areas and create overloads with the United back four.

The introduction of Modric was a smart if not obvious substitution for Mourinho to make after gaining a man advantage. With United's midfield retreating deeper and deeper the Croatian found the space just outside the 18 to unleash a fine strike for the equalizer. For the winner, he bisected the United midfield line with a ball through to Higuain. The Argentine would play a 1-2 with Ozil before driving a low ball across the face of goal for Ronaldo to tuck home.

Knowing United needed to score two goals to win the tie, Mourinho replaced Ozil with Pepe who slid in at right back. Higuain moved out to the right when Madrid were defending and Ronaldo stayed high up the pitch at center forward, knowing he'd have the space to run at Ferdinand and Vidic with United chasing the game. Mourinho's side began to defend quite deep and failed to control possession with their man advantage. They were on the back foot for most of the final 15 minutes and were only able to maintain their goal advantage due to a handful of fine saves from Diego Lopez.

Conclusion
Ferguson deserves credit for United's approach in this game. They were organized, compact and countered effectively. That United would have hung on and won were it not for Nani's red card was hardly a foregone conclusion but up to that point they had been the better side.

After the game Mourinho suggested the better team had lost. While he may well have simply been buttering up a club many expect him to manage when Ferguson retires, he doubtlessly would have been disappointed with his side's inability to create many genuine chances when the game was still 11 v. 11. Still, they deserve credit for getting the job done in a hostile atmosphere at Old Trafford.

Juventus 2-0 Celtic: Juve forwards exploit 2 v. 2 at the back

Juventus put in a vintage Italian performance in a 3-0 win over Celtic at Parkhead, sitting deep and organizing themselves defensively to deal with wave after wave of Celtic's frenetic attack and finishing their few forays into the attacking third with magnificent efficiency. While many an observer of this game will argue Celtic battered their Italian opposition and were unfortunate to lose in the manner they did, the Italians were prepared for this type of game and deserve loads of credit for executing their system and making it difficult for Celtic to break them down in the final third.

Celtic missed a golden chance in the first half when Ambrose, included in the starting 11 despite playing in the final of the ANC Sunday, headed straight at Buffon from 6 yards out. Aside from that, Juventus were rarely stretched at the back to the point of defending desperately- they were compact, organized and able to deal with crosses into the area.

Juventus were without Kwadwo Asamoah who was deemed unfit after playing for Ghana in the ANC third place game Saturday. He was replaced at left wing back by Federico Peluso. Vucinic and Matri partnered up front- Quagliarella, Giovinco and Anelka all had places on the bench. Elsewhere the side was as expected in their usual 3-5-2.

Neil Lennon opted for an interesting, narrow 4-3-2-1 'Christmas tree' formation. Lustig, Ambrose, Wilson and Izaguirre lined up across the back. Brown, Wanyama and Mulgrew formed a central midfield three. Mulgrew and Wanyama tended to stay deeper while Brown was given license to get into more advanced areas on the right. James Forrest and Kris Commons played narrow just in behind Gary Hooper and then would look to make runs out into the channels behind Juve's wing backs.

Neil Lennon's tinkering with his formation was a brave one but made sense given his side's intent on pressing high up the pitch. The 4-3-2-1 shape meant Juventus didn't have a spare man anywhere on the pitch when Celtic pressed and therefore made it very difficult to play out of the back. Commons and Forrest pushed on to the outside center backs Caceres and Barzagli and Hooper pressed Bonucci. Brown tracked Pirlo as he dropped in to try to collect the ball of his center backs, which left Wanyama and Mulgrew to mark Marchisio and Vidal 2 v. 2. Celtic's outside backs Lustig and Izaguirre pushed high up the pitch on to Juve's wing backs. Ambrose and Mulgrew were therefore responsible for defending Matri and Vucinic 2 v. 2 at the back.

Without a spare central defender at the back, Celtic's success was always going to depend on whether Wilson and Ambrose could win their individual battles with the Juve forwards. Against Chelsea and Shakhtar Donetsk in the group stages Juventus showed how devastating the movement of their two forwards can be against two center defenders. One forward will typically drop into midfield, forcing one of the opposition center backs to follow him into midfield and thereby opening up space for either a diagonal run from the other forward or a burst in behind from midfield by one of the shuttling midfielders Vidal or Marchisio.

With Celtic's tireless pressing denying Juve the time and space on the ball to build any patient attacks, the Italians frequently looked to play balls over the top to their forwards, confident that eventually Matri or Vucinic could win their individual battle and go through on goal. They'd have been pleasantly surprised at just how quickly the strategy came to fruition. Peluso played a simple ball over the top to Matri in the third minute. The Juve forward shrugged Ambrose aside and slotted a shot past Fraser Forster and across the goal line before it could be cleared away.

Juve's second goal highlighted the ability of their forwards to open up space for their shuttling midfielders to make runs in behind the back four. Ambrose and Wilson were again tight on Matri and Vucinic respectively. Matri checked for the ball back into midfield, forcing Ambrose to follow his run and leaving acres of space to the right of Wilson. Marchisio darted past Brown into that space and Matri provided him with a clever flick that the midfielder dutifully dispatched. You can see a screen shot of the build up to the goal below. Marchisio sees Matri making his run into midfield and immediately begins his run in behind as Peluso plays the ball into Matri.

At 2-0 the tie looked done and dusted. When Ambrose was caught in possession in the 83rd, allowing Juve to tack on a third, all doubt was erased as to Celtic's fate in the final 16.

Note: I didn't quite find the time to analyze the Juventus defense versus Celtic attack- obviously quite an important feature of the game given 40% of the game took place in Juve's defensive third. Hopefully I'll have time in the next couple days to revisit this post and add more on that.

Liverpool miss Sturridge's vertical threat in loss to WBA

West Brom produced an unlikely 2-0 victory over Liverpool at Anfield despite taking 20 fewer shots and being outpossessed 59% to 41%. The home side missed a slew of decent opportunities before Gareth McAuley's header put the Baggies ahead on 81 minutes, including Ben Foster's penalty save on Steven Gerrard in the 77th.

Despite controlling the balance of play and managing to force Foster into a couple of fine saves, Liverpool lacked a bit of industry in the final third, largely owing to the absence of Daniel Sturridge to a thigh problem.

Luis Suarez took up the center forward position recently occupied by Sturridge while Jonjo Shelvey played in the hole behind him. Jordan Henderson was used as a left sided attacker and Stewart Downing played on the right wing. As he so often does when lined up as the main striker, Luis Suarez would drop off the opposition center backs and collect the ball between the lines. He's tremendous at drifting into defensive seams, turning and running at the back four. However, without Sturridge's pace, Liverpool lacked anyone making runs in behind the West Brom center backs for balls to be played through. When Suarez collected the ball between the lines, no one made the type of interior run in behind that might threaten Jonas Olsson and McAuley. As a result, one center back could step to Suarez while the other sat in to provide cover.

Sturridge often tends to remain high up the pitch on the shoulder of one center back. When Suarez plays in the hole behind him and manages to get the ball in the seams it forces the free opposition center back to step out to him and opens space for Sturridge to make a diagonal run into the space opened up by the center back moving out to Suarez. Without a vertical option in behind the defense, Liverpool often shuffled the ball wide to the right where Downing and Glen Johnson looked to combine and get crosses in the box. The two combined for 17 crosses, with Downing alone crossing 13 times. Several of Downing's balls in were excellent but without a physical #9 like Andy Carroll in the side, getting the ball wide and crossing it into the box is never likely to be an effective strategy for Liverpool. Olsson and McAuley are more comfortable dealing with high balls into the area than with pacey forwards running in behind them. Only two of Downing and Johnson's 17 crosses found a Liverpool player, despite a number of them being quality balls in.

Liverpool produced some decent football at times and will feel unfortunate to have failed to take anything from a game in which West Brom produced virtually nothing offensively for the first 80 minutes. However, the absence of Sturridge's pace meant they were often forced to attack down the wings and send 50-50 balls into the box- a difficult strategy when you're playing without an actual number nine. It was no surprise then that they produced some of their best chances, including Luis Suarez winning the penalty, when Fabio Borini came on at striker and Suarez dropped into the withdrawn role. Sturridge is a more suitable center forward than Borini however and Brendan Rodgers will be keen to have him back in action. It's incredible that Liverpool have still failed to manage a win against a side in the top 10.

Klinsmann gets second half adjustments wrong

The United States' World Cup qualifying campaign got off to a troubling start in San Pedro Sula as Honduras overcame an early Clint Dempsey goal to emerge 2-1 winners. Despite fielding an offensive 4-3-3 formation, Jurgen Klinsmann's side were cautious in the first half and created few quality goalscoring chances throughout the 90 minutes.

4-3-3
Klinsmann surprisingly left veteran and team captain Carlos Bocanegra out of the back four, opting instead for a center back pairing of Geoff Cameron and Omar Gonzalez. With Timmy Chandler and Fabian Johnson taking up the fullback positions, the back four was comprised of four players taking part in their first qualifying campaign. It was a brave decision on the part of Klinsmann to go with youth over experience- and Bocanegra's replacement Omar Gonzalez was one of the US's better players- but we're left to wonder whether Bocanegra would have provided the organization at the back to prevent Jerry Bengston's second half winner.

Danny Williams sat in midfield just in front of the back four. Michael Bradley and Jermaine Jones played as shuttling midfielders higher up the pitch.

Jozy Altidore was given the start at center forward. Clint Dempsey occupied a narrow position on the right and Eddie Johnson played a bit wider on the left.

The US started the game cautiously, with the midfield dropping fairly deep and allowing Honduras to to circulate the ball around the back. When Honduras had the ball deep in their own half, Dempsey and Johnson would push up alongside Altidore so that the US defended with a forward bank of 3 in front of a midfield bank of 3 in front of the back four. Strangely, the front 3 didn't press Honduras's back four and instead only offered token pressure. With plenty of time on the ball, the Honduran back four were easily able to advance the ball past the forward three. At this point, Dempsey and Eddie Johnson would drop in alongside Jones and Bradley to form a midfield bank of four. Williams dropped in to fill the gap between the defensive and midfield banks of four- making the US defensive shape more or less a deep 4-1-4-1. That the US didn't press wasn't a surprise. In an away qualifier Klinsmann was always going to be cautious and the 90 degree temperature would have made pressing unsustainable. However, it was a bit strange Dempsey and Johnson didn't immediately drop off into the midfield when the US lost possession.

The deep 4-1-4-1 shape meant Altidore was often left isolated up front. Honduras pressed when the US won the ball back, A combination of Honduras's pressing and some untidy passing from the US made it difficult to possess the ball out of the back and advance up the pitch with short passes. As a result, the US were frequently forced play long into Altidore and hope he could retain possession long enough for reinforcements to join in the attack. When the US were able to keep the ball, Dempsey drifted centrally from the right just in behind Altidore while Johnson stayed wider on the left. They looked most dangerous when Altidore checked back to collect the ball in between the lines of Honduras's 4-4-2. This forced one of the Honduran center backs to step out with him, leaving a hole in the center of the Honduras defense for the US to play balls in behind for Dempsey and Johnson making runs from the outside.

Honduras's opener came from a spectacular overhead kick from Juan Garcia but the corner kick that ultimately led to the goal was a result of Honduras's pressing and a lapse of concentration from Chandler who had a difficult afternoon. Chandler failed to clear his lines inside his own box, allowing Carlos Costly to nick possession. Gonzalez made a fine last ditch tackle on Costly but Garcia scored on the resulting corner.

Diamond 4-4-2
The US set out in the second half in a what would typically be described as a diamond 4-4-2 but what in reality was more 4-2-2-2. Bradley dropped deep alongside Williams and looked to collect the ball from Cameron and Gonzalez and link passes forward to Dempsey and Jones who were playing narrow higher up the field. Eddie Johnson played alongside Altidore as a center forward pairing. Bradley was given the deeper role because he's a more creative passer than Williams- the US needed a more creative player in that role to link defense to the four more advanced attackers.

Presumably Klinsmann made the tactical switch to enable the US to control possession by playing with four midfielders in the center of the field. Honduras had 57% possession in the first half and Klinsmann likely wanted to take the game to them more in the second half. While the switch did result in the US keeping the ball better in midfield, the lack of any wide players allowed plenty of space for Honduras's midfielders to run into when they regained possession.

Flat 4-4-2
Maurice Edu replaced Williams in a like for like sub on 58 minutes. Sacha Kljestan was brought on for Eddie Johnson a minute later, prompting another tactical change from Klinsmann. Kljestan played wide on the left, Jones went to right midfield and Dempsey moved up front alongside Altidore in a 4-4-2. Graham Zusi, a player used to being employed on the right wing for the US, replaced Jones in the 68th minute. The US defended in two banks of four- Edu and Bradley were side by side- while Altidore and Dempsey stayed high up the field. The switch meant the US no longer had the extra center midfielder to fill in the space between the two banks of four- the position Danny Williams had played in the first half.

Two things were almost immediately noticeable when Klinsmann made the switch. Without the extra center midfielder, Honduras began to find space to collect the ball in the gap between Bradley-Edu and Gonzalez-Cameron, leaving the US back four dangerously exposed. The absence of a third center midfielder also meant there was a huge gap in the middle of the field between Bradley and Edu and Dempsey and Altidore when the US were on the ball. With Edu and Bradley deep and Dempsey and Altidore high up the field, they had no one to fill the space in between and provide a link from midfield to attack. After falling behind 2-1, the US couldn't regain possession and when they did they struggled to keep it long enough to create anything meaningful. The olé chants that came from the home crowd as their side easily passed the ball around the US midfield in the closing moments of regulation time were a frustrating reminder of Klinsmann's frequently inability to get his tactics and personnel decisions right in important games.

Arsenal 2-2 Liverpool: Rodgers scraps possession philosophy for counterattacking approach

Brendan Rodgers adopted an uncharacteristic counterattacking approach in an intriguing 2-2 draw against Arsenal at the Emirates. Liverpool finished the game with just 38% possession, by far their lowest total in a league game under Rodgers, and only the fourth time they've been out-possessed this season. The strategy looked as though it had worked perfectly when Jordan Henderson put the Reds 2-0 ahead in the 60th minute but Arsenal began exploiting pockets of space either side of Lucas Leiva who was sitting just in front of the Liverpool back four. Both the Gunner's goals resulted from collecting the ball in the area between Lucas, left back Glenn Johnson and center back Daniel Agger.

With the exception of Pepe Reina replacing Brad Jones in goal, Liverpool fielded the same side that defeated Norwich 5-0 in their last league outing.

Arsenal made no changes to the side that beat West Ham 5-1 a week ago.
 

The theme of the game was established early and didn't change throughout the 90 minutes- Arsenal pressed high up the pitch and looked to regain possession quickly, Liverpool sat deep, soaked up pressure and looked to play on the break.

Defensively, Liverpool used a 4-1-4-1 formation. Henderson and Steven Gerrard pressured Jack Wilshere and Aaron Ramsey in possession while Lucas sat just in front of the back tracking the movement of Santi Cazorla. The strategy was to not allow Ramsey and Wilshere to get goal side of Gerrard and Henderson where Lucas would be forced to leave Cazorla and step to ball. Downing and Suarez tracked the forward runs of Gibbs and Sagna.

Offensively, Liverpool looked to counter through Suarez and Downing breaking in behind Arsenal's outside backs and through Henderson darting into space behind Wilshere and Ramsey and in front of the Arsenal center backs. Effectively, what was 4-1-4-1 in defense became 4-2-3-1 when Liverpool were in possession with Lucas and Gerrard rarely joining forward. The player influence graphic below shows Lucas's and Gerrard's average positions were actually as deep as Agger's over the 90 minutes.

When Liverpool found an outlet ball to Suarez, Henderson or Downing, they'd look to play the ball through to Sturridge behind the Arsenal center backs. Suarez's opener was more a result of a comedy of defensive errors from Arsenal than anything tactical but Liverpool did create some very good scoring chances off of counterattacks. Shortly after taking the lead Downing released Suarez in behind Sagna down the left flank after Liverpool had regained possession. Suarez chested and played a wonderful volleyed through ball behind the defense to Sturridge but he put his effort wide. Later in the half Downing broke into the middle of the pitch on the counter and played Henderson in behind the defense towards the edge of the box. Henderson chipped over after Szczesny left his line but the move highlighted Liverpool's effectiveness on the break.

Second Half
The second half continued in much the same way as the first. Arsenal continued to boss possession in midfield but they increased their tempo in possession and become more vertical with their passing. Liverpool were clearly straining a little more defensively early in the half as Arsenal combined with more passing combinations higher up the field. A main contributing factor to Arsenal's increased threat in the attacking half was that they began to exploit the space either side of Lucas between Liverpool's defensive and midfield banks of four. Cazorla drifted from the middle into these areas and was then able to look for gaps between the center back and fullback to slip balls through. On the right, Walcott tucked inside, leaving Lucas and Johnson to communicate whether Johnson would track him inside or Lucas would shift over. Arsenal were beginning to find pockets of space between the lines they hadn't in the first half. With the Gunners seemingly on the ascendency, Henderson's goal on the hour mark from more blundering Arsenal defending came as a bit of surprise. Mertesacker and Andre Santos, brought on to replace the injured Gibbs in the first half, were the main culprits this time as both allowed the Liverpool midfielder to beat them too easily.

However, Arsenal's response was emphatic as they struck twice in three minutes to draw the score level. As they had begun to do early in the half, Arsenal exploited the space in front of Agger and Johnson and to the left of Lucas for both goals. For the first goal Walcott was able to cut in field from the right, forcing Lucas to slide over to provide help and commit a foul. Giroud scored from the resulting kick. On the second goal Cazorla drifted unmarked into this zone and was able to play a decisive ball for Giroud whose layoff Walcott finished in style. Jose Enrique was introduced on the left wing to provide added defensive cover there after the Gunners had equalized, with Suarez moving to forward and Sturridge coming off.

Arsenal's energetic second half pressing prevented Liverpool from finding the outlet passes to spring counters they had in the second half. 10 of Arsenal's 13 interceptions came in Liverpool's defensive half. Fatigue set in for Suarez, Henderson and Downing as the half wore on and they weren't able to break into space behind Arsenal's midfield as they had in the opening period.

It was surprising to see Rodgers take such a pragmatic approach and allow Arsenal to take the game to them. His likely reasoning however seems understandable- in Wilshere and Ramsey, Arsenal had two deeper lying midfielders that like to get into more advanced areas and aren't used to the responsibility of breaking up counterattacks. He thought he'd be able to exploit space in behind these two on the break and indeed he was right- had Sturridge's and Henderson's finishing been a bit more clinical in the first half, Liverpool may have put this one to bed. That they completed just 54 passes in the attacking third, by far their lowest total of the season, is evidence they were prepared to play the bulk of this game inside their own half. While Rodgers has been praised for his belief in his possession-based system, some have suggested he may be a bit tactically inflexible. Today showed he is at times willing to adjust his tactics.

The tempo of Arsenal's passing and movement was excellent in the second half. The second goal was wonderfully worked and they deserve a great deal of credit for showing the patience in their system to come back. An enjoyable game overall and probably a fair result in the end.