Tactical Analysis: Arsenal 1-0 Wigan Athletic

A 60th minute Mikel Arteta penalty after Theo Walcott had been clipped by Jean Beausejour in the box gave Arsenal a 1-0 win over Wigan. On the balance of play Arsenal may have been fortunate to emerge with the three points and that was largely because Roberto Martinez got his tactics spot on while Arsene Wenger made a questionable substitution that nearly cost the Gunners. A defensive mistake from  Beausejour and poor delivery from wide areas proved costly for Wigan

Wigan started in their normal 3-4-3. Martinez didn't have any of his first choice center backs available so dropped James McCarthy back from midfield to play at the center of the back three. David Jones played alongside James McArthur in the center of midfield.

Wenger stuck with the same lineup he used in Monday evening's 5-2 win at Reading. Theo Walcott was employed at center forward while Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain played wide on the right.

The most interesting tactical feature of the game was Wigan's use of their back three. Because Arsenal were in a 4-2-3-1, Wigan had a 3 v. 1 advantage in the center of defense and therefore had two spare center backs. The two man advantage at the back also meant they were short a man in the center of midfield. To even the numbers in the midfield, McCarthy stepped into the midfield in front of the "outside" center backs Boyce and Figueroa and man marked Santi Cazorla. Wigan still had a spare man at center defense- Boyce and Figueroa were 2 v. 1 with Walcott in deeper areas. Wigan's wing backs picked up Arsenal's wide forwards. In effect, defensively Wigan were playing with a back four of Stam, Boyce, Figueroa and Beausejour with McCarthy playing a holding midfield role tracking Cazorla between the seams. Then when Wigan won possession Beausejour and Stam would push high up the pitch from their wing back positions and McCarthy would drop between Figueroa and Boyce to form a back three. This is very similar to the way Barcelona play with McCarthy playing the Sergio Busquets role.

The strategy worked to stifle Cazorla's offensive contribution. He played the pass that led to Walcott being awarded the penalty but aside from that he had a relatively quiet afternoon with McCarthy constantly tracking his movement.

Offensively, Wigan tried to overload Arsenal in wide areas with their wing backs and wide forwards looking to get Arsenal's fullbacks in 1 v. 2 situations. With Arsenal's wide forwards often failing to track Beausejour and Stam defensively, the two Wigan wing backs were often able to get the ball in space on the flanks. However, their delivery from wide areas was poor all afternoon.

Wenger made the game's first substitution on 75 minutes, replacing Podolski with Coquelin. Cazorla moved to the left and Coquelin played in the middle of midfield. I assume Wenger made the substitution to give the Gunners some extra bite in the middle of the pitch but Wigan were mainly threatening from the wings- it was a poor decision from Wenger and one that nearly proved costly. Cazorla is not good at tracking runners defensively and helping his fullbacks. Within minutes of making the change Stam had blown past Cazorla and received the ball in space down the right wing. Again his final delivery was poor but Wenger's decision to move Cazorla to the left nearly cost Arsenal. Finally, in the 90th minute he brought on Koscielny for Cazorla to provide Gibbs with some protection on the left. It was a substitution he should have made immediately when he had taken off Podolski.

That Wigan lost was no fault of Martinez who got his tactics spot on and frustrated Arsenal defensively for large parts of the game while threatening down the wings. However, they lacked the final delivery needed and still could use a center forward that is lethal in front of goal.

Preview: Chelsea vs. Tottenham

Andre Villas-Boas and Roberto Di Matteo will lead their respective clubs out to a lunchtime kickoff at White Hart Lane tomorrow. There are plenty of sub plots in this one. Villas-Boas was of course sacked by Chelsea in March, paving the way for Di Matteo to lead the club to a historic FA Cup-Champions League double. That Champions League title sent Spurs crashing out of a qualification spot for this season's installment of the tournament despite finishing fourth in the league- two places above Chelsea. In April, Chelsea handily beat Spurs 5-1 in an FA Cup semifinal. However, Spurs contend a wrongfully allowed Juan Mata goal that made the score 3-1 was the turning point in that contest. Perhaps most importantly, this game showcases the Premier League's two most sartorially inclined managers in a battle over the better wearer of impeccably tailored suits.

Both sides are playing decent soccer at the moment. After a rocky opening three games to the season, Spurs have won four straight including the club's first away win at Old Trafford since 1989. A 0-0 draw at QPR is the only blemish on Chelsea's record as they sit four points clear at the top of the Premier League table.

Same Formation, Different Styles
Both sides are likely to line up in 4-2-3-1 formations though the different attributes of the two teams' sets of players mean they'll play it with very different styles. Chelsea's three attacking midfielders, Oscar, Hazard and Mata, are clever and technically gifted players who look to get in pockets of space between the seams and play intricate passing combinations with one another. Mata and Hazard will frequently switch sides and both will drift in field and occupy more central areas. Chelsea will likely look to attack patiently and use their tight control and quick passing to create gaps to get the ball in behind the Tottenham defense. Expect Ramires to play over Lampard to give Chelsea more athleticism in the middle of the park to match the athleticism of Sandro and Dembele.

Spurs attacking midfield three doesn't have the same technical quality as that of their counterparts but they have incredible pace and athleticism. Lennon and Bale will look to get the ball wide into the channels and get behind Chelsea's outside backs. Dempsey isn't a typical center attacking midfielder that links defense to offense- he doesn't have that type of passing vision- however Spurs will mainly transition from defense to offense through either Lennon and Bale or through Dembele's powerful runs forward from a deeper position. Dempsey's ability to make well timed runs and finish off chances will make him a threat for balls into the box from Lennon and Bale.

Tottenham wingers vs. Chelsea outside backs
Two of the most important individual battles will be fought in wide areas between Chelsea's outside backs and Tottenham's wingers. The contest between Ivanovic and Bale will pose a particularly difficult tactical question for Di Matteo, specifically how brave he wants Ivanovic to be with his positioning going forward. With Mata and Hazard frequently tucking inside higher up the pitch, Chelsea like to get width from their outside backs in the attacking end of the field. However, when Ivanovic pushes forward it will be open space for Spurs to counter into with Bale. The last thing Chelsea want is Bale running at full pace at their center backs. His goal against Manchester United (at 0:25 in the video below) shows just how dangerous he is when he's able to get the ball behind the opposition right back (Rafael on that day) and run with a head of steam at center backs. Lennon's pace could also be dangerous on the right, though Ashley Cole is quicker and a better defender than Ivanovic so should be more equipped to deal with Lennon's bursts forward.

If Lennon and Bale are able to get in behind the Chelsea outside backs, Chelsea's ball side center back will have to rotate wide to step to ball, leaving Defoe in a 1 v. 1 situation with the other center back. Dempsey's runs into the box from midfield will provide more of an aerial threat on crosses while Dembele's late runs to the edge of the area can create dangerous shooting chances, as was seen in his goal against Norwich. 

Chelsea's Tempo
Chelsea will likely hope to control the tempo of this game and keep it played at a relatively slow pace. Spurs are far more athletic and powerful than they are creative and therefore a more open game will suit them better than it will Chelsea. Expect Chelsea to keep things compact at the back, defending fairly deep with two banks of four. With the likes of Dembele, Lennon, Bale, Dempsey and Defoe, Tottenham are far more dangerous when they have the space to turn and run at defenders than when they have to circulate the ball quickly with passes to unlock crowded defenses. Against a tight defense, Tottenham don't have the type of players that are as clever with their movement and creative with their passes as Chelsea. Given this is an away game for Chelsea, they'll be particularly keen not to allow this one to open up and rile up Spurs fans.

Conclusion
This game will largely come down to which team can impose its style on the game early. If Spurs can turn this into an open game, their pacey attackers and athleticism will give them the advantage. If Chelsea can control the tempo and allow their four most advanced players to use their clever movement and superior technique going forward, they'll have the advantage.

US continue to struggle to turn possession into goals

Daniel rightfully pointed out that my previous post gave far too much credit to Jurgen Klinsmann for making what any professional soccer coach would have realized was a necessary move away from Bob Bradley's 4-4-2 and introducing three-man central midfield formations. During Bradley's tenure, it became rather obvious his favored 4-4-2 was allowing the opposition too much space in the center of the park- Klinsmann can hardly be considered a brilliant tactician simply for recognizing that fact. While his tactical shifts have created a more solid spine down the center of the field, the US continues to struggle to translate midfield dominance into genuine goal scoring opportunities. A 92nd minute goal from Eddie Johnson against Antigua & Barbuda spared Klinsmann the blushes of what would have been one of the most humiliating defeats in the team's history but signaled the team has to improve quickly if they want to avoid a nervous final phase of qualification.

Some of the US's offensive difficulties can reasonably be blamed on the challenges that accompany playing CONCACAF opposition on the road- playing on dreadful pitches in front of hostile crowds is no easy task (although it would be quite a stretch to say the 8,000 fans that attended Sir Vivian Richards Stadium Friday created an intimidating atmosphere), particularly in torrential weather when the opposition defends with all 10 men in their own defensive third. However, it's still deeply concerning that the US has had such a difficult time converting dominant possession figures into genuine goal scoring opportunities against vastly inferior opposition. Despite holding 72% possession Friday against Antigua & Barbuda, the US could only muster four shots on target. The frightening truth is that the US has not looked good on the road once in this phase of qualifying. In fact, you could reasonably argue the first half of the 1-0 home win over Jamaica was the only decent half we've played thus far.

One good half out of ten played does not bode well for the team in the final hexagonal phase of qualification, assuming the US get a result over Guatemala tonight and qualify. Based on current standings, the hexagonal would consist of Guatemala, USA, Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama and Canada. With the possible exception of Canada, those are all very difficult places to play. Given current form, it doesn't seem inconceivable that the US could struggle to finish in the top three and secure automatic qualification.

How responsible Klinsmann is for the recent run of unconvincing performances is difficult to say. While he can take credit for the fact his controversial roster inclusions of Alan Gordon and Eddie Johnson proved to be a difference maker against A&B, legitimate questions should be raised about how the US put themselves in a position where they needed a last minute winner in the first place. This phase of qualifying was expected to be a cakewalk for the Americans and it probably should have been. That they've left themselves with work still to do in the final game against Guatemala to ensure passage to the next stage suggests the US may not be adjusting to Klinsmann as quickly as had been hoped. We knew from the outset Klinsmann wanted to introduce a patient, possession-based system and has done so. But while his style has certainly allowed the US to dominate possession, too much of that possession occurs in the middle third of the field. As we move the ball into the attacking third we often lack the technical ability and inventiveness required to unlock compact defenses. Throughout the field, the ball moves from player to player too slowly, allowing defenses to easily shift and retain their proper shape. There's a sneaking suspicion that Klinsmann's ambition for how he wants the team to play does not much the technical ability of the players at his disposal. While I applaud his ambition of bringing a more modern brand of football to the USMNT, his job is, first and foremost, to qualify for the World Cup. Qualifiers are not the time to be dogmatic about your ideals, sometimes pragmatism is necessary.

This isn't to say Klinsmann is doomed to fail. The world of international football has its examples of teams that have struggled in the buildup to major tournaments but gone on to achieve great things. Carlos Bilardo won only three of his first 15 games in charge of Argentina and only one of seven in the buildup to the 1986 World Cup. Argentina would go on to win that tournament. The US is obviously less talented than Argentina and no one is expecting them to win the World Cup in Brazil but the point is that Klinsmann will ultimately be judged on how he performs at the World Cup if the US qualify, not on how convincing they were in qualification. Poor performances in qualifiers and friendlies would be quickly forgotten if Klinsmann can get the team into the knockout stages in Brazil. The challenges of playing in a World Cup are very different than those of a CONCACAF qualifying campaign and may actually better suit Klinsmann's style of play. Pitches will certainly be wider than 70 yards so there will be better opportunities to stretch defenses laterally and play with more width. Few if any teams will be frightened enough of the US to defend with nine men in the defensive third so there should be more opportunities to get in dangerous pockets of space in and around the 18 and more opportunities to counter. Opponents will be more talented but will also open themselves up. This should allow the US to rely less on technique and clever passing-which they've been forced to do against compact CONCACAF defenses and isn't the strongest aspect of the American's game- and more on athleticism.

Getting ahead of myself though. Let's get a result tonight first.